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INTRODUCTION

American labor arbitration was firmly established by 1941 and had already
taken the shape it has today. The concept of arbitration was widely known and
appreciated, as were many refinements of that concept.1 Arbitration was a widespread practice, with arbitration clauses found in two-thirds or more of all
collective bargaining agreements. There were a number of experienced arbitrators, especially in industries using permanent impartial umpires such as
clothing and coal mining. Participants were familiar with the hearing process,
briefs and awards. Scholarly commentators began to treat arbitration as a fit
subject for law reviews, and courts began to discard their old hostility to the
2
arbitration process.
The discipline of labor arbitration, however, was not yet mature. Maturation required a much wider degree of acceptance, a sounder theoretical base,
and a larger, more experienced body of practitioners. Those requirements were
met during and after the Second World War. As a result, arbitration is now
the final method of dispute resolution specified in almost every collective
bargaining agreement in this country.s This article examines the maturation
of American labor arbitration and describes its major developments in the
last four decades.
I. Among these refined concepts were the distinction between interest and grievance
arbitration, the "just cause" principle, and the relative merits of the "judicial" and
"mediator" models of arbitration.
2. Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv.
373 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Nolan & Abrams, Early Years].
3. The most recent survey found arbitration provisions in 97% of all collective bargaining agreements. The figure was 99% in the manufacturing operations. 96 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) E-2 (May 17, 1983).
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LABOR ARBITRATION: MATURING

YEARS

Most commentators focus on the second National War Labor Board (WLB)
as the progenitor of modem labor arbitration. 4 The WLB's impact should not
be overstated, given the degree to which arbitration had developed before the
Board's existence. The WLB did, however, have lasting influence on labor
arbitration. The first part of this article therefore concentrates on the WLB's
role in resolving labor disputes during World War II. The second part describes the changed legal environment in which modem labor arbitration
operates. The third and fourth parts deal with changes in the theory and
practice of labor arbitration since 1945.
I.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND LABOR ARBITRATION

DURING WORLD WAR II
The approach of war and increasing threat of strikes in the early 1940s
triggered governmental concern for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.
This concern was justified as the incidence and severity of strikes began to
rise in 1941. The number of idle man-days resulting from strikes rose from over
450,000 in December 1940 to more than 1,500,000 in March 1941.5 Strikes in
defense plants were particularly troubling as the nation moved closer to war.6
Government involvement in labor disputes in World War II paralleled the
pattern of involvement during World War I. As in the First World War, there
were three discernible phases. In the first phase, the government relied on
cooperation with organized labor and on encouragements to self-restraint. In
the second phase, primary reliance was still upon voluntary action, but a greater
degree of compulsion was introduced. Government activity was relatively decentralized in these two phases. In the third phase, government control became
more centralized and compulsion set the tone of government activity.8
The first phase began in mid-1940 and continued until the creation of the
National Defense Mediation Board in March of 1941. The second phase was
coterminous with the life of that body, and ended with the establishment of
the National War Labor Board in January 1942. The WLB, less concerned
4. The first National War Labor Board existed during World War I. See Nolan &
Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 404-07. Commentators writing shortly after the Second
World War also focused on the impact of the second National War Labor Board on
labor arbitration's modem development. See, e.g., E. WrrrE, HmsroIcAL SuRvEy OF LABOR
ARBrrRATiON 58 (1952). Those writing more recentiy have taken the same position. See, e.g.,
P. FuLEWNG, THn LABOR ARBrrATiON PROCESS, 15-19 (1965); Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 746 (1973); Klare, Labor Law as
Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDus. REs L.J.
450, 463 (1981); Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CAsE W. REs.
896, 413-16 (1979); Raffaele, Lawyers in Labor Arbitration, 37 ARm. J. (n.s.) 14 (Sept. 1982).
5. A. RPCHADmS, WAR LABOR BoAR s IN THE FiELU 17-18 (1953).
6. J. SEIDbIAN, AMERICAN LABOR FROm DEFENSE TO RECONvERsIoN 42-44 (1953).
7. On the government's activities in labor disputes during the First World War, see
Nolan & Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 401-08.
8. Chalmers, Derber & McPherson, Summary and Conclusions, in U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIEs OF DIsPsUTE SETTLEMENT AND WAGE STABILxATioN DUGING WORLD
WAR II, at 1, 6 (1950) (Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1009) [hereinafter referred
to as Summary and Conclusions]. See also Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion in Dispute
Settlement, id. at 26, 35-36 [hereinafter referred to as Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion].
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with voluntary settlements than its predecessor agencies, reached its highest
degree of compulsion when given authority over wage stabilization matters late
in 1942.
There were several important differences between the government's actions
in the two wars. Most importantly, in the Second World War the government
acted much earlier and passed through the first two stages quicker. This response was probably due to the greater warning the government had the second
time around. 9 It might also have been due to the fact that policy makers in
the Second World War had the advantage of the experience of the First.
Preparationfor Wartime Labor Disputes
The WLB exercised a powerful influence on modern American labor
arbitration. In turn, the Board was significantly influenced by earlier agencies.
It is thus appropriate to review the first and second phases of World War II
labor dispute resolutions before examining the WLB itself.
The first major action in preparation for wartime labor disputes was made
on May 28, 1940, when President Franklin Roosevelt established the National
Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC). The NDAG was composed of "advisors" who were expected to function individually rather than collegially.
Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, was appointed Advisor on Employment. The dynamic Hillman soon transformed this
modest position into the highly visible Labor Division of NDAC. Hillman also
organized a Labor Policy Advisory Committee composed of sixteen labor union
representatives to act as a liason between the NDAC and organized labor. Because the Department of Labor's Conciliation Service failed to resolve postdepression labor-management disputes, Hillman created a Labor Relations
Branch to mediate disputes. 10 The Labor Division and its Labor Relations
Branch had no formal power, relying instead on persuasion, co-optation and
patriotic appeals. The Labor Division thus functioned as a first phase agency,
using cooperative and decentralized tactics rather than compulsion."
9. American involvement in the war came gradually - between September 1939, and
December, 1941. This period of transition permitted a reasonably orderly adaptation
of industrial life to the needs of the emergency. Moreover, it allowed the Nation to
experiment with new techniques and procedures, such as the National Defense Mediation Board in the field of labor disputes.
Summary and Conclusions,supra note 8, at 2. By comparison, President Wilson had reason
to expect American involvement in World War I more than a year before he broke diplomatic
relations with Germany but he established no labor dispute adjustment agencies until
June of 1917, two months after the formal declaration of war. Nolan & Abrams, Early Years,
supra note 2, at 401-02.
10. A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, at 16; M. JOSEPHSON & S. HILLMAN, STATESMAN OF
AMERICAN LABOR 512-14 (1952).
11. Joint advisory committees were established in several industries. Acting either
through the advisory committee or independently, Hillman and his staff attempted to
prevent or stop strikes. See R.

PURCELL, LABOR POLICIES OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

ADVISORY

1942, at 7-9,
168 (1946) (Historical Reports on War Administration: War Production Board Special Study
No. 23); A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, at 16-17. Hillman's work with the Advisory Commission

COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF PRODucTION
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This arrangement lasted until January 1941 when President Roosevelt established the Office of Production Management (OPM) and appointed Hillman as Associate Director General. In March the NDAG's Labor Division was
transferred to OPM and given the duty to "assist in the prevention and adjustment of any labor controversies which might retard the defense program.... 12

Hillman's Labor Relations Branch had few tools available to prevent or
resolve strikes. Hillman claimed to have settled 239 out of 241 potential strikes
brought to his attention, 13 but his claim should be taken with some skepticism.
One thorough post-war study described the work of the Labor Relations Branch
in ambivalent terms:
Without power or defined policy but with good intentions, this Branch sustained
organized labor, feuded with the Labor Supply Branch, in which there was little labor
impress, and often duplicated the work of the United States Conciliation Service which
failed to satisfy labor management or to keep abreast of the growing flow of disputes.4

President Roosevelt's advisors pressed for the establishment of a new agency
to deal with labor disputes, a body with more power than the Labor Division of
OPM. In March 1941, on the recommendations of Hillman and Secretary
of Labor Frances Perkins,15 the President created the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB). 6 This marked the end of the first, and totally voluntar-

istic, phase of government involvement in labor relations.'

7

The NationalDefense Mediation Board

The NDMB was composed of eleven members, four each from labor and

management and three representing the general public. While designated as
a dispute-resolution agency, the NDMB could act only on those disputes certified by the Secretary of Labor as threatening "to burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials essential to the national
defense ... and which cannot be adjusted by the commissioners of conciliation
of the Department of Labor...."i The NDMB was authorized to investigate

is described in J. SEmmAN, supra note 6, at 26-30 and in M. JosEpHsON, supra note 10, at 50328.

12. P.

PURCELL,

supranote 11, at 16-17.

18. Id. at 171.
14. Id. at 168.
15. See G. MRTiN, MADAM SECRETARY, FRANCES PERKINS 449 (1976). Hillman's biographer
gives more credit for the creation of the NDMB to Hillman and claims Perkins initially
opposed a new agency. M. JOSEPHSON, supra note 10, at 541-42.
16. Exec. Order 8716, 3 C.F.R. 914 (1938-43 compilation). See generally BuRwAu oF
LABOR STATISTICS,

UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR,

REPORT

ON

THE WORK

OF THE

NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD, MARCH 19, 1941-JANuARY 12, 1942 (Bureau of Labor
Statistics Bulletin 714) [hereinafter NDMB REPORT].
17. Hillman was not appointed to the NDMB, and his Labor Division was neither transferred to the new agency nor abolished. The Division's jurisdiction was curtailed gradually,
and Hillman's status in the government steadily deteriorated. R. PuRcELr, supra note 11, at
29-83.
18. Exec. Order 8716, 3 C.F.R. 914 § 2 (1938-43 compilation).
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disputes and make recommendations 19 as well as assist parties in establishing
their own methods of dispute resolution.20 The NDMB was also authorized to
2
designate an impartial arbitrator at the parties' request. 1
There were now three government agencies, in addition to the National
Labor Relations Board, in the labor dispute resolution business: the NDMB,
the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, and Hillman's Labor
Division of OPM. In theory these bodies acted seriatim. Hillman's agents would
attempt to resolve any labor dispute in the defense industry coming to the
attention of the Labor Division. If they failed, the case would be certified to
the Department of Labor and the Conciliation Service would try to obtain a
settlement. If no agreement was reached and the dispute threatened defense
production, the Secretary of Labor would certify the controversy to the NDMB.
If the NDMB failed to settle the dispute, the last step was an appeal to the
22
President to use his emergency powers.
In practice, however, things did not work quite so smoothly. The President's failure to abolish or transfer the Labor Division when the NDMB was
created exacerbated the jurisdictional disputes already existing between the
Division and the Conciliation Service. This overlap between the groups led
23
to jurisdictional conflicts and confusion.
The NDMB was obliged to act through tripartite divisions. Upon acquiring
jurisdiction of a dispute, it was to attempt mediation and if that was fruitless
to recommend voluntary arbitration. If the parties rejected voluntary arbitration, the NDMB would hold hearings and make its own recommendations on
the merits of the dispute.2 4 The Board's ambiguous functions as both peace25
maker and judge were a source of difficulty.
In theory the recommendations of the NDMB were not binding, but in
practice they were very persuasive. The Board could bring public opinion to
bear on the disputants by making public its finding and recommendations. It
could also certify the dispute to the President who could and sometimes did
use his emergency powers to take over a plant.2 6 The possibility of presidential
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 2(d).
Id. § 2(a) Se(c).
Id. § 2.
R. PuRcELL, supra note 11, at 179-80.

23. A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, at 18-19; J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 56. Cf. V. BREEN,
THE UNITED STATES CONCILIATION SERVICE 87 (1943) (overlap between the OPM's Labor

Division and the Conciliation Service cancelled out the efforts of both agencies). The agencies
were forced to accommodate one another. For example, rather than trying to decide
recognition disputes itself, the NDMB learned to request the NLRA to expedite them. The
NDMB also limited its involvement in unfair labor practice cases. F. WrTNEY,
EXPERIENCES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1941-1945, at 105-06 (1949).

WARTIME

24. NDMB REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
25. It is unusual for one individual or one agency to possess the requisite skills for both
tasks and attempting to do both creates a certain conflict of interest. Even with the necessary
skills, it is almost impossible to maintain the proper relationship with the parties while performing such diverse tasks. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 57.
26. A. RICHLARDS, supra note 5, at 20. John L. Blackman, Jr., in PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN
LABOR DISPUTES 259-60 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as J. BLACKIMAN] lists only three instances of plant seizures after violation of an agreement with the NDMB or after noncompliance with an NDMB recommendation: the Inglewood, California, plant of North American

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/1
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seizure added the first major element of compulsion to the federal government's labor relations policies during World War II. Although seldom used,
the mere .potential for its use encouraged "voluntary" agreements. 7 The
government also had some control over striking employees. Just as some
World War I draft boards had threatened to revoke strikers' draft deferments, 28 so in the Second World War the Director of the Selective Service demanded reclassification of defense workers who refused to accept NDMB
the
recommendations.2 9 As a result of these powerful but unofficial pressures,
0
NDMB's "recommendations" took on the force of arbitration awards.3
The NDMB encouraged almost-voluntary arbitration even though it engaged in almost-compulsory arbitration. In several decisions, the Board recommended binding arbitration agreements.3 1 These recommendations were not
always accepted and one subsequent dispute led to presidential seizure.32 Another case in which the NDMB's recommendation was rejected led to the
demise of the NDMB itself.
In that case, titled Captive Coal Mines, the NDMB rejected the demand of
the United Mine Workers (UMW) for a closed shop.33 The next day the two

NDMB members who represented the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(IO), with which the UMW was affiliated, resigned. 4 Eventually the government acceded to the UMW by sending the dispute to an ad hoc arbitration
board whose "neutral" member, the Director of the Conciliation Service, was
known to favor the dosed shop.- Although the Captive Mines dispute was

resolved, the CIO members never returned to the NDMB. Without them
the Secretary of Labor was reluctant to certify other CIO cases to the Mediation

Board. Without a CIO member, the Board had little success in resolving pending CIO cases. 3 6
Obviously something had to be done to put the NDMB back on track.37
Aviation; Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., in Kearny, New Jersey; and Air Associates,
Inc., in Bendix, New Jersey.
27. V. BrN, supra note 23, at 91 (the parties to a labor dispute are much more likely
to reach agreement if they know that failure to agree will result in compulsory arbitration).

28. Nolan &Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 405.
29. V. Breen, supra note 23, at 101.
30. As one contemporary scholar put it, "ri]n practice the Board's power to investigate and
to issue findings and recommendations for settlement was closely akin to compulsory arbitration with compulsory acceptance of the award, though technically and legally it cannot be so
designated:' H. KALTNBOmN, Gov msuNTAL ADJUsTmENT OF LABOR DIsPUTEs 93 (1943). See
also Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion, supra note 8, at 40-41.
31. NDMB REPORT, supra note 16, at 194, 195; H. KALTENBoRN, supra note 30, at 97.
32. H. KALTENBORN, supranote 30, at 98-99.
33. Id. at 101.
34. Philip Murray, President of the CIO and one of the NDMB members who resigned,
explained his resignation by stating that the NDMB's Captive Mines decision "has made it
impossible for labor to retain any confidence in its future actions." Murray's position was
unanimously endorsed by the CIO annual convention. H. KALTENBoRN, supra note 30, at 102.
The story of the CIO walkout is well told in Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion,
supra note 8, at 42-45.
35. G. MATxN, supra note 15, at 450; M. JosEPns6N, supra note 10, at 563-64.
36. H. KALTEN oN, supra note 30, at 102; NDMB REPORT, supra note 16, at 8.
37. With the NDMB stymied by the CIO walkout, interested parties began to look for
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The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor gave the President an opportunity to
resolve the NDMB deadlock. This opportunity gave rise to the National War
Labor Board (WLB) and ushered in the third and least voluntary phase of
wartime regulation of labor relations.
The Second National War Labor Board
Four days after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt invited representatives
from business and labor to participate in a Labor-Management Conference. 38
At the end of a week, labor and management agreed on three basic principles:
there would be no strikes or lockouts during the war; disputes should be settled
by collective bargaining; and the President should establish a new board to
make final determinations on those issues not settled in negotiations. The
only sticking point was the matter of union security. Labor representatives felt
that in return for giving up the right to strike unions should be able to seek
the closed shop and other forms of compulsory unionism before the new board
if they were unable to obtain them in negotiations. The employer representatives insisted that the union security issue be excluded from the board's jurisdiction. The Conference reached a deadlock, with unions favoring a three-point
resolution that would allow the board to resolve "all" labor disputes and employers insisting on a fourth point removing union security matters from the
board.39
When President Roosevelt was informed of the deadlock, he replied: "We
can't expect perfection. I'll accept the three important points they have agreed
alternative ways to deal with labor disputes in this critical period. The presidents of the AFL
and the CIO, William Green and Philip Murray, publicly called for a labor-management
conference and the idea received private support from influential government officials, including Secretary of Labor Perkins and NDMB chairman William Davis. Business leaders
were not enthusiastic.
Several congressmen and senators began to introduce legislation to restrict strikes during
the emergency. One of these proposals, the Smith Bill, would have made illegal all strikes
called without a prior majority vote of the employees concerned and would have imposed a
cooling-off period before a strike could begin. The Smith Bill passed the House with almost
a two-thirds majority, but Senate consideration was interrupted by the Pearl Harbor bombing
on December 7th. The next day the chairman of the Senate Labor Committee, Senator
Elbert Thomas of Utah, requested that action on the Bill be postponed to allow labor and
management "to agree on a method of voluntary settlement as a substitute for governmental
action." In the end the Senate never acted on the Smith Bill. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 7273; see also A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, at 23.
38. A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, at 22-23. Secretary of Labor Perkins' biographer credits
her with the ideas for the Labor-Management Conference and the National War Labor Board
which resulted from it:
As the first board began to crumble, she insisted to representatives of both labor and
management: "No matter what you do, another board will be created. It has to be.
There is no other way to handle this situation .. " [S]he went about creating a new
board to serve as a final court of appeals for wartime labor disputes. She planned to have
it emerge from a conference of labor and management on wartime labor relations, and
in preparing for the conference she met again and again with individuals and groups
in an attempt to enlarge the areas of agreement.
G. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 450.
39. G. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 451; A. RicHARDs, supra note 5, at 24.
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on with thanks. I'll promise to appoint the board promptly.... We'll let the
40
board make its own rules and regulations and determine its jurisdiction."
The President then sent a letter to that effect to the conferees. The labor
members were delighted, of course, but the employer representatives were
shocked because they had made their acceptance of the three points contingent
on the fourth. Nevertheless, they formally accepted "the President's direction
for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a War Labor
Board." Employer representatives warned that the battle on union security was
not yet over, and urged that the Board adopt the principle they had been
41
fighting for.
The WLB was officially created on January 12, 1942 when President Roosevelt abolished the National Defense Mediation Board and created the WLB
in its stead.42 The WLB consisted of twelve members, four each from labor,
management, and the public, plus a number of alternate members. The Board
was also authorized to appoint "associate members" to serve as mediators. 48
By May the Board was sufficiently organized to begin recruiting about a thousand part-time appointees to engage in mediation, factfinding and arbitra-

tion. 44

The WLB's jurisdiction extended over "labor disputes which might
45
interrupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war,"
but it did not include "labor disputes for which procedures for adjustment or
settlement are otherwise provided until those procedures have been exhausted."' 6, Generally, the WLB would not act until the Secretary of Labor
certified the case as not having been resolved through the normal procedures
of the Conciliation Service. 47
Once the WLB assumed jurisdiction over a dispute, it was empowered to
"finally determine the dispute" through "mediation, voluntary arbitration, or
arbitration under rules provided by the Board."48 This brief statement reflected the primary formal distinction between the NDMB and the WLB: the
40. Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion, supra note 8, at 50; A. RICMAsws, supra note
5, at 24.
41. H. KALTENBORN, supra note 30, at 113; Chalmers, Voluntarism and Compulsion, supra
note 8, at 50.
42. Exec. Order 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (193843 compilation).
43. Exec. Order 9038, 3 C.F.R. 1082 (1938-43 compilation).
44. H. KALTENBORN, supra note 30, at 114-15.
45. Exec. Order 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (193843 compilation).
46.

Id.

47. Id. § 3. Unlike the NDMB, however, the WLB could act on its own motion if it so
desired. H. KALTENBORN, supra note 30, at 118-19. Exec. Order 9250, 3 C.F.R. 1213 (1938-43
compilation), issued on October 3, 1942, broadened the WLB's jurisdiction "to cover all industries and all employees." That Order was primarily concerned with wages and salaries
but it extended the WLB's jurisdiction over non-vage disputes as well. A. RICHARDs, supra
note 5, at 27-28. The WLB was also directed to avoid invading the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board and to refrain from making decisions inconsistent with the
National Labor Relations Act. With two government agencies operating in such a limited
field there were many jurisdictional conflicts. Most of these were amicably resolved. F. WrrNzY,
supra note 23, at 117-22. On the wartime relationship between the NLRB and WLB, see
generally id. at 115-50.
48. Exec. Order 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (193843 compilation).
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WLB was given authority to "finally determine" disputes while the NDMB
could only encourage voluntary arbitration and make recommendations. 4 9 In
practice the distinction was not so sharp. The NDMB's recommendations, like
the final determinations of the WLB, were backed by the possibility of presidential involvement, including plant seizure. Presidential seizure was seldom
required, however, because its mere possibility induced acceptance of WLB
decisions. 50 Even so, the replacement of the NDMB by the WLB marked another step toward more government compulsion in preventing and resolving
labor disputes.5 '
A major principle that guided the Board throughout its existence was that
disputes should be settled by collective bargaining, assisted by government
mediation only if necessary. If a third-party decision was required, the parties
were encouraged to establish their own procedure for arbitration. Compulsory
arbitration was to be used only as a last resort. It is at this point, with the
WLB's encouragement of voluntary arbitration and the possibility of compulsory arbitration, that the government's World War II labor relations
policies connect with the history of labor arbitration. The two developments
were meshed for the rest of the War.
The WLB was initially charged with resolving labor disputes between employers and employees. Soon it received the additional task of administering
the government's wage stabilization program. The Emergency Price Control
Act stated that government agencies should work toward "a stabilization of
prices, fair and equitable wages, and cost of production.52 The Act stated,
however, it should not "be construed to authorize the regulation of . . .
compensation paid by an employer to any of his employees."5 3
The WLB had minimal authority over wage disputes between employers
and unions. It had even less authority in the case of "voluntary" wage increases.
If an employer and a union were in agreement, there was no dispute on which
the Board could rule. To close this loophole in stabilization policies, President
Roosevelt asked Congress for the authority to control wages. 4 Congress responded by passing the Economic Stabilization Act which authorized the
President to issue an appropriate executive order. 55
The next day, President Roosevelt issued an executive order giving the WLB
control over all changes in wage rates. 56 Although the order ritually reaffirmed

49. H. KALTENBORN, supra note 30, at 119 (quoting Exec. Order 9017, 3 C.F.R. 1075
(1938-43 compilation) § 3).
50. There were only six instances of plant seizures during the first year and a half
of the WLB's existence. The number increased dramatically after the WLB was given power
over wage control matters in 1943. See J. BLACKMAN, supra note 6, at xv and 261-75.
51. V. BREEN, supra note 23, at 102.
52. Pub. L. No. 421,56 Stat. 23, § l(a) (1942).

53. Id. § 302(c).
54. Douty, The Development of Wage-Price Policies in UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES OF DIsPuTE SETrLEMENT DURING WoRu WAR II, at 104, 109-33
(1950) (Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 1009) [hereinafter referred to as

PROBLEMS

AND POLICIES].

55.
56.

Pub. L. No. 729, 56 Stat. 765 (1942).
Exec. Order 9250, 3 C.F.R. 1213 (1938-43 compilation).
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the government's commitment to "free collective bargaining", 57 the Board
was given power to approve or reject negotiated wage increases. The Board's
attempt to limit wages while prices continued to rise was largely unsuccessful.
In the most visible challenge to wage stabilization, John L. Lewis and his
United Mine Workers union defied the Board in a 1943 wage dispute. They
ultimately received most of their demands, 58 but at the price of stirring Congress
to pass and-strike legislation.
On July 25, 1943, Congress passed (over President Roosevelt's veto) the
War Labor Disputes Act.5 9 The Act gave the WLB its first express statutory
existence and then proceeded to restrict strikes. Section 3 authorized the
President to take possession of plants when labor disputes hampered the war
effort. Section 6 made it a crime to strike a plant operated by the government.
In all other plants, the law simply imposed a cooling-off period and required
a pre-strike vote of employees on the strike issue to be conducted by the
National Labor Relations Board. Congress apparently hoped that patriotic
employees would reject strike calls by their union leaders during the War,
but the hope proved futile.60
The War Labor Disputes Act was a confused measure. Its ostensible purpose was to prevent wartime strikes, yet it implicitly authorized strikes after
the cooling-off period and the required vote.61 Most union leaders attempted to
abide by the no-strike pledge given at the War's beginning, but the strike
ballot sometimes took matters out of their hands. Among other unintended
results, it outraged the very union officials whose support for the War was
critical. The War Labor Disputes Act had little impact on the WLB, leaving
its composition, powers, policies and procedures largely intact, and it had little
discernible impact on the frequency of strikes.62
In its first few months of existence the WLB's organization and procedures
remained simple. All disputes were initially referred to the Board's standing
Committee on New Cases. The Committee could refer a case directly to the
full Board, but ordinarily it assigned the case for mediation. If mediation
failed, the parties were urged to arbitrate. If one or both of the parties
refused arbitration, the mediator submitted a report with recommendations to
the Committee on New Cases. The Committee could then refer the matter to
57. Id. § 8.
58. F. DULLES, LABOR IN AmuIcA 337-39 (3d ed. 1966).

59. Pub. L. No. 89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). The law was more commonly known as the
Smith-Connally Act. It was passed in reaction to a strike by the United Mine Workers that
continued even after the government seized the mines. J. SInmAN, supra note 6, at 137-38.
60. The strike vote provision was, according to all of the evidence, "completely ineffective in preventing strikes, and in fact made it more difficult in some cases for union
leaders to restrain their followers." Votes in favor of strikes rose from 68% in 1943 to 72%
in 1944 and to 84% in 1945. In most cases, however, work stoppages did not actually take
place. "The strike-vote system meant only an expensive detour on the road to settlement of
disputes by the processes of collective bargaining or by wartime government determination
of issues." Brown, The NLRB-Wagner Act Through Taft-Hartley Law, in LABOR IN PosrMAR
A amrc& 179, 184-85 (C. Warne, et al., eds. 1949).
61. F. DouLes, supranote 58, at 34041.
62. J. Sm. AN, supra note 6, at 189-90; Freidin & Ulman, Arbitration and the National
War Labor Board, 58 HARV. L. Rzv. 309, 314-15 (1945).
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the full Board. The Board in turn could render a decision based on the
report, hold hearings, or refer the case back for further investigation.
The Board's increasing work load, particularly after receiving responsibility
for wage control matters, made these centralized and relatively informal procedures inadequate. In October of 1942, the Board appointed regional officials
and established regional offices, 63 but had no intention of dispersing its power.
By January of 1943, the backlog of cases and resulting public criticism forced
the Board to decentralize some of its power and administration. Consequently,
the Board established twelve regional offices and appointed tripartite regional
boards in each region. The regional boards were given the same powers as the
national board subject to discretionary intervention by or appeal to the WLB
64
itself. That discretion was rarely exercised.
The procedures followed by the regional boards tracked those of the
national board. A regional new case committee initially assigned disputes to
part-time, tripartite panels. The panels held hearings and prepared reports
which were summarized by a disputes division and presented to the regional
board for action. 65
Enforcement of regional or national board orders was problematic because
neither level of the WLB possessed formal enforcement power. The WLB
could refer instances of noncompliance in wage cases to the Director of
Economic Stabilization or to the President in dispute cases but this rarely
happened. Compliance was usually achieved by public pressure and by persuasion, a process aided by the tripartite composition of the boards. 66
War Labor Board PoliciesAffecting or Involving Arbitration
The general work of the National War Labor Board is not of direct
relevance here, and it has been well described elsewhere.67 Of immediate importance are the Board's policies and activities which directly and indirectly
encouraged the use of arbitration. Several of those activities will be discussed
in this section.
The WLB's Pro-Arbitration Policy
The WLB's consistent policy in favor of voluntary arbitration for resolving
labor disputes, particularly grievance disputes, was largely a manifestation of
its broader preference for collective bargaining. 8 Agreements to arbitrate were
63.

1 NATIONAL

WAR LABOR BOARD, THE TERMINATION

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR

LABOR BOARD 782-84 (1949) [hereinafter referred to as TERM. RE.].
64. See H. MILLIS & R. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 771-72 (1945). For the best account of the regional boards, see generally A. RICHARDS, supra note 6. A shorter but still
valuable treatment is Orfield, The Regional War Labor Boards, 29 IOWA L. REv. 253 (1944).
65. The reports usually reflected only the public member's opinion, even though it
might have been cleared with other panel members. Some regional boards used full-time
hearing officers in place of the part-time panels, but this practice was uncommon. A. RI CHARDS,
supra note 5, at 203, 209-10.
66. Id. at 211-14.
67. See, e.g., PROBLEMS AND POLIcIEs, supra note 54; A. RICHARDS, supra note 5, especially
chapters VIII-XI; 1 TERM. REP., supra note 63, especially Part I, §§ III-V.
68. Witte, Wartime Handling of Labor Disputes, 25 HARv. Bus. REv. 169, 177 (Winter,
1947) [hereinafter referred to as Witte, Wartime Handling].
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much closer to collective bargaining than government determination of the
merits of disputes, the only other option when strikes are banned. The Board
was following a prewar pattern in its preference for arbitration. The Board's
work in this field, its General Counsel wrote toward the end of the War, "has
not been innovation; rather, it has extended [to] large segments of industry
principles and practices which in actual operation had long proved workable."69
Its preference for arbitration was pragmatic, for the Board thought arbitration
was the best method of avoiding strikes which would impede production.7o
To some extent the WLB was pushing on an open door so far as arbitration was concerned. Many employers in major industries had either accepted
grievance arbitration before the War 7' or were willing to do so without much
urging. The automobile industry illustrates both approaches. General Motors
had signed arbitration agreements with the United Auto Workers (UAW) in
1937 and 1940.72 The UAW sought arbitration in its 1942 negotiations with
the Ford Motor Company. Despite the WLB's involvement in the negotiations
the draft contract did not include an arbitration clause. Union and company
negotiators went to the office of Harry Bennett, the Ford official in charge of
labor relations, to sign the contract. Richard Leonard, National Ford Director
for the UAW, had the following discussion with Bennett, as reported by the
chairman of the union's negotiating committee:
Bennett says, "Well, did you guys get everything you wanted."
Leonard says, "No."

"Well, what didn't you get."
"Well, one thing we wanted was an Umpire."
"What the hell is an Umpire? Is this a ball game or something?"
So Leonard explained to Bennett that an Umpire is a guy to whom you refer a
grievance that you can't get together on, and he decides which side is right, and
that's it.
Bennett turns around to his negotiators and says "What the hell's wrong with
that. How come you guys didn't give them an Umpire. Well, give 'em an Umpire
too.

..

"

So we got an Umpire.78
69. Freidin & Ulman, supranote 62, at 341, 344 (1945). See also M. Da.aER, TaE AMmuCAN
1865-1965, at 385 (1970) (WLB extended arbitration "to
numerous industries where it had been previously rejected').
70. That the Board saw a close connection between arbitration and winning the war, the
reason for the Board's existence, was reflected in a policy statement issued in 1943:
IDEA OF INDUsTRIAL DEMOCRACY,

These fundamental American values and aids to successful prosecution of the war
can be attained by grievance procedures which provide . .. for the final and binding
settlement of all grievances not otherwise resolved. For this purpose, provision should
be made for the settlement of grievances by an arbitrator, impartial chairman or
umpire under terms and conditions agreed to by the parties.
1 TERm. REP., supranote 63, at 66.
Winning the War was not the only factor on the Board's collective mind. The Board
recognized that its temporary existence should not impair the voluntary arbitration process
available to resolve disputes after the War. See Freidin & Ulman, supra note 62, at 324.
71. See Nolan & Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 418-19.
72. Id. at 419.
73. G. Heliker, Grievance Arbitration in the Automobile Industry 118-19 (1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (quoting Percy Llewellyn).
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WLB Support for Negotiated Arbitration Procedures
The Board's policy preference for arbitration would have been of little
importance if it had not been translated into action. Thus, the Board flatly
refused to decide any dispute that was subject to existing voluntary arbitration
procedures. Moreover, the Board required disputing parties to follow their
own arbitration agreement ard to abide by any stipulation that the arbitration
award be final and binding.4 This practice represented a conscious break with
judicial attitudes toward arbitration:
The Board has consistently rejected the outmoded common-law view that arbitration
is to be regarded with hostility because it ousts the jurisdiction of regular public
tribunals. It has accepted instead the modern concept . . . that such agreements are
75
favored and that aid should be given their enforcement.

For the Board's policy preferences to be credible, it had to accept the
validity of arbitration awards and to enforce them even in questionable cases.
Unrestricted review of the merits would have made arbitration simply another
step to be completed before the parties reached the real decisionmaker.76 The
Board's consistent support of private arbitration decisions presaged the deference paid to arbitration today by courts and, to a lesser extent, the National
Labor Relations Board.
Throughout its first year the Board considered each case separately. Yet
without an intellectual basis for its decisions, Board policies and principles became vague. Although the Board favored arbitration, it failed to clarify either
the degree of its preference or the reasons for it. This clarification was finally
supplied in 1943 by Board decisions and by adoption of formal policy statements.77
The leading decision setting out Board policies was Smith & Wesson. 7 In
that case, both substantive and procedural objections were raised when the
company refused to accept three parts of an arbitrator's award. The case was
certified to the WLB following the failure of conciliation efforts. At the same
time the company filed suit in state court to set aside the objectionable parts of
the award. The company argued that any Board action taken while litigation
was pending would violate the requirement that all other settlement procedures
74. Freidin & Ulman, supra note 63, at 315; Witte, Wartime Handling, supra note 68, at
177-78.
75. Freidin & Ulman, supra note 63, at 315.
76. "[E]xcessive or imprudent review would destroy the wartime usefulness of arbitration
as an effective instrument for the peaceful settlement of disputes." Id. at 324.
77. Id. at 317. See also Statement of Policy Concerning Review of Arbitration Awards
(Sept. 1, 1943), reprinted in 2 TERAr. REP., supra note 63, at 694-95 [hereinafter Statement of
Policy]; Arbitration Policy Adopted by NWLB (Nov. 26, 1943), reprinted in 2 TEasu. REP.,
supra note 63, at 695-97 [hereinafter Arbitration Policy].
78. 10 War Lab. Rep. 148 (July 30, 1943). A few months earlier, in Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 6 War Lab. Rep. 467, 468-69 (Feb. 13, 1943), the Board had refused to review
a nonwage award of an arbitrator, but its opinion contained little discussion on point. Id.
at 468. In the same opinion the Board distinguished wage cases, which the WLB was obliged
to review closely because of its wage stabilization responsibilities. Id. at 469. See I TERM.
REP., supra note 63, at 405-10 (Board review of arbitration decisions concerning wage issues).
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be exhausted before the Board assumed jurisdiction.79 The Board held that
the "other available procedures" requirement did not include post-arbitral
resort to the courts. It recognized that a court could set aside an arbitrator's
award, but until that occurred the Board's directive order enforcing the award
would be effective.80
The Board emphasized that an arbitrator may not exceed the authority
conferred on him by the parties and that any departures from the agreement
would be void. Otherwise, when acting within the scope of his authority the
arbitrator's decision was to be given every reasonable presumption. The Board
refused to reconsider the arbitrator's award in Smith & Wesson because it
found no proof of "fraud, misconduct, or other equally valid objection."' 1 The
WLB likewise insisted that the Regional War Labor Boards protect the
finality of nonwage arbitration and not substitute their own judgment for
that of the arbitrator.82

Wage issues were more problematic because the Board had been expressly
charged with enforcing wage stabilization regulations. Thus the Board could
not readily accept arbitrator's awards without first ensuring compliance with
applicable wage stabilization rules. Yet even in these cases the Board generally
refused to rehear wage issues or to question the arbitrator's discretion. Wage
awards would instead be reviewed "only in terms of whether the amounts
granted will have an unstabilizing influence as measured by Board policy."8 3
Labor and management quickly perceived that doubtful cases were frequently
resolved in accordance with the arbitrator's view. Moreover, arbitrated wage
cases were automatically approved unless they were modified within a certain
period, and the WLB's large backlog of cases guaranteed that many passed
through without review8 4 As a result, parties sometimes sent negotiated wage
settlements, which might not be approved if submitted directly to the WLB,
to an arbitrator for his signature. These "agreed awards" constituted a deliberate device to avoid the strictures of wage stabilization regulations85
Board-Ordered Arbitration Agreements
In addition to supporting voluntarily negotiated arbitration agreements
and resulting awards, the WLB increasingly insisted on the inclusion of
arbitration dames in labor contracts. The process steadily tended toward
79. Exec. Order 9017, 3 C..R. 1075 (1988-48 compilation).
80. 10 War Lab. Rep. at 149-56. Similarly, the WLB refused to tailor its decisions to
comply with the varying requirements of state arbitration laws because to do so would
impose "an intolerable administrative burden" and would "furnish opportunity for dilatory
tactics by one who seeks to delay or thwart the effective solution of controversy." Friedin &
Ulman, supra note 62, at 816.
81. 10 War Lab. Rep. at 158 (quoting Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island
Power &Transmission Co., 64 R.I 204, 222, 12 A.2d 789, 748 (1940)).
82. E.g., Republic Aircraft Products Div., 12 War Lab. Rep. 491 (Nov. 22, 1948); cf.
Freidin &Ulman, supranote 62, at 822-28.
88. New York Herald Tribune, 7 War Lab. Rep. 9, 10-11 (Mar. 10, 1948).
84. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRAToRS, ORAL HIsroRY PROJEcr, interview with William
E. Simkin, at 46 (1982).
85. Stein, Labor Arbitration Under Mobilization, N.Y.U. 4th ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 291,

298 (1951).
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more detailed specifications by the Board. For example, in the Board's first
year, the WLB refused to order the parties in Chrysler Corp. 6 to include an
arbitration clause in their agreement. The Board did recommend, however,
that they give "earnest consideration" to an impartial umpire system.8 7 In other
early cases, the Board attempted to encourage voluntary arbitration by directing the parties to include a provision for a "mutually satisfactory form of
arbitration" in their contracts. 8 By the time the Chrysler dispute reached the
Board again, the Board's attitude had hardened and it flatly ordered arbitration as the final step in all grievances.8 9
General directions to enter arbitration agreements proved inadequate when
labor and management could not agree on the arbitration procedure or the
scope of the arbitrator's authority. As a result the WLB began to spell out
more carefully the arbitration clause to be adopted.90 The Board usually
defined the arbitrator's jurisdiction as covering all grievances or disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the contract. 91 Substantially the
same definition is found in most modern collective bargaining agreements.
86.
87.

3 War Lab. Rep. 447, 452-54 (Oct. 2, 1942).
See G. Heliker, supra note 73, at 130-32.

88. 1 TERM.

REP.,

supra note 63, at 181 (citing cases).

89. 10 War Lab. Rep. 551, 555 (Aug. 27, 1943); cf. G. Heliker, supra note 73, at 134. The
parties retained autonomy over the style and details of their arbitration system. When
Chrysler and the United Auto Workers implemented the Board's decision, they designed
an arbitration system retaining many features of the bipartite appeal board in use since
1939. They made the umpire an adjudicator to be used only after careful investigation by the
parties themselves, in contrast to the mediator role filled by the permanent umpire at
General Motors. See Wolff, Crane & Cole, The Chrysler-UAW Umpire System, 11 PRoc.
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 111 (1958); 1 TERM. REP., supra note 63, at 132-33.
Ford Motor Company, which had included an arbitration clause in its contract with the
UAW after WLB-assisted negotiations in 1942, was allowed to adopt a radically different
umpire system much closer to the General Motors model. G. Heliker, supra note 75, at 12025. Both Chrysler and Ford selected the WLB officials who had worked with them during
negotiations when it came time to select their umpires. Id. at 119-21, 135.
90. On July 17, 1945, Region I in Boston adopted the following standard arbitration
clause:
In the event that any grievance arising out of the application or interpretation
of this agreement is not resolved under the grievance procedure hereinabove set
forth, either party may, within ten (10) days, in written notice to the other, submit
such grievance to arbitration. In the event the parties are unable to agree upon a
mutually satisfactory arbiter within five (5) days after such notice, either party may
request that the Regional War Labor Board, Region I, designate an arbiter, transmitting
a copy of such request to the other party. The decision of the arbiter shall be final and
binding on both parties. The cost of each arbitration proceeding is to be equally
divided between the Company and the Union.
Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator shall be limited to the grievances arising out of the
application or interpretation of this agreement.
In the event that either party raises a question as to the arbitrability of a grievance
under this section, the Arbitrator shall first determine the arbitrability of the grievance
before proceeding to the merits of the grievance.

3 TERM. REP., supra note 63, at 65.
91. 1 TERM. REP., supra note 63, at 181. The WLB made it clear that the arbitrator
could not alter or amend the contract. Freidin & Ulman, supra note 62, at 346-47.
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This tendency toward greater detail involved the Board in several thorny
issues. For instance, the Board was frequently faced with conflicting demands
for a permanent or an ad hoc arbitrator. Although it expressed a strong preference for permanent arbitrators, the WLB only ordered such arrangements
"where the employer expressed no serious opposition or where exceptional
circumstances warranted a permanent arbitrator despite management opposition." 92 Another issue resolved by the Board was the process for selecting
an arbitrator. Generally it ordered the parties to try to agree on an arbitrator,
but if they failed to agree and their agreement did not provide a mechanism
for appointment, the Board ordered its regional boards to appoint an arbitrator.9 3

Arbitration by the WLB
In addition to ordering parties to adopt arbitration agreements, the WLB
routinely ordered arbitration of specific disputes. Selection of an arbitrator by
the parties was the preferred method, but the Board did not hesitate to designate an arbitrator when necessary. 94 The WLB accorded awards in Boardordered arbitration cases the same deference given to awards in voluntary
arbitrations.9 5 In a broader sense, almost all of the WLB's rulings were arbitration awards, albeit of a not-completely-voluntary type.
The Board preferred to avoid treading on the turf of other agencies such
as the National Labor Relations Board. Thus it usually refused to rule on
jurisdictional disputes between unions. This was not an absolute rule, and
the WLB occasionally ordered the disputing unions to proceed to arbitration
rather than to the National Labor Relations Board.96 As a result, arbitration
was used by parties who otherwise would not have chosen that method and
in disputes which normally would not have been resolved in that fashion.
Given the tripartite composition of the National and Regional War
Labor Boards, it is not unreasonable to view them as arbitration panels. The
WLB tried to preserve a distinction between its arbitration and non-arbitration
activities, but that distinction was difficult to maintain. In Alaska Salmon Industries,97 for example, the five-member regional board transformed itself into
92. 1 TERm. REP., supra note 63, at 132; see also Witte, Wartime Handling, supra note
68, at 178.
93. Statement of Policy, supra note 77, at 694-95; see also 1 TraE. 1in., supra note 63, at
133-34.
94. Arbitration Policy, § 2(a), supra note 77, at 696.
An award in a Board-ordered arbitration case not involving wages was not reviewable on
the merits. Id. § 5, at 696-97. Either party, however, could still appeal to the courts. Awards
involving wages or salaries were reviewable "in accordance with the Board's wage stabilization
policy," but that did not necessarily involve a full review of the merits. The Board or its
agent would instead "seek to determine whether the arbitrator has correctly applied all the
criteria of the Board's wage stabilization policy to the facts of the case." The case could
then be referred back to the arbitrator if it was found that the arbitrator "manifestly erred"
in applying the wage stabilization policy. Id. § 4(a), at 696.
96. "Due rather to the urgency of quick decision to hasten the installation of machinery
for war production than to any theoretical considerations, the Board has actually, though
quite unwillingly, required arbitration of several demarcation disputes." Rice, The Law of the
National War Labor Board, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 470, 486 (1942).
97. 11 War Lab. Rep. 677 (Oct. 19, 1943).
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a three-man arbitration board and issued an award. The WLB reversed the
decision because the regional board had not clarified the panel's arbitration
function. According to the WLB, the regional board should have reduced the
alleged submission to writing and explained the nature of the proceedings to
the parties. Although the procedural requisites should have been fulfilled, it is
doubtful whether there would have been any substantive differences between
an award by an arbitration panel and a formal decision by the same people
98
sitting as a Regional War Labor Board.
The major dispute among commentators over the WLB's arbitration
function was whether or not it amounted to "compulsory arbitration." 99 On
the one hand, the WLB was charged with finally determining a dispute after
assuming jurisdiction. 100 Moreover, the parties were compelled to take their
disputes before the Board. The Board could act on the Secretary of Labor's
certification or on its own motion, regardless of the parties' wishes. Finally, its
decisions were effectively binding because they were backed by public opinion,
by other government agencies, 101 and ultimately by the possibility of plant
0 2

seizures.1

On the other hand, the Board's decisions were legally only advisory. 10 3 Plant
seizure was indeed a possibility, but it was seldom used. When it was used it
did not significantly affect the employer because the same management continued and the government channeled profits to the owner.10 4 Surprisingly, no
wartime measures outlawed strikes other than those in government controlled
plants. The War Labor Disputes Act did impose a thirty-day cooling-off period
and did require a secret ballot election among employees on the strike question.
Nonetheless, the clear implication was that after an affirmative vote, (which

98. If the various war labor boards may fairly be considered as acting as arbitration
boards, they were certainly the busiest and probably the most successful such panels in
American history. By one count the boards decided 21,000 cases and those decisions were
complied with in all but about 300 instances. E. WrrrE, supra note 4, at 57. These figures do
not include the thousands of wage stabilization cases handled by the WLB.
99. One commentator noted that, "Eflor all that it lacked enforcement powers the War
Labor Board in its disputes settlement constituted a gigantic compulsory arbitration board."
Stein, Labor Arbitration,supra note 85, at 292. The chairman of the WLB, William H. Davis,
admitted as much in 1942: "There is no escaping the fact that this framework of collective
bargaining erected on the basic no-strike agreement contains an element of forced acceptance.
It is in substance arbitration." (quoted in V. BR.X-EN, supra note 23, at 90 (footnote omitted)).
100. Executive Order 9017, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1938-43 compilation). Section 7 of the War
Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), which finally gave the WLB a statutory basis,
contained a similar provision ordering the Board, after a hearing to "decide the dispute and
provide by order the wages and hours and all other terms and conditions . . .governing the
relations between the parties .. "
101. Local draft boards, for example, were known to take steps to cancel the draft deferments of strikers, although this was never a fixed policy. Witte, Wartime Handling, supra
note 68, at 172.
102. There were 51 seizures from the time the WLB was established through the end
of the War. J. BLACKMAN, supra note 26, at xv and 261-75.
103. Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. NWLB, 143 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C.
Cir. 1944); NWLB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 US. 774 (1944).
104. Witte, Wartime Handling,supra note 68, at 174-75.
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was the normal result) a strike was lawful. Indeed, the act did not expressly
forbid a strike even after a negative vote.105
Perhaps the fairest conclusion is that the WLB functioned as an arbitration
board with both voluntary and compulsory elements. Participation before the
Board was usually voluntary but occasionally compulsory. Its decisions were
in law only advisory but in practice were backed, when necessary, by the full
force of government. Because Board orders were usually accepted, either
voluntarily or by coercion, full governmental force was seldom needed.
The NationalWar LaborBoard and Arbitration:
An Evaluation
The reputation of the War Labor Board in the area of arbitration has
changed in recent years. Earlier writers asserted, as did Foster Rhea Dulles, that
the "full record of the National War Labor Board, for all its difficulties and
for all the criticism it aroused, constituted a very real success for this unprecedented experiment in tripartite labor arbitration."'' 0 Today a practitioner of the WLB period can claim that the Board actually delayed the development of labor relations. 0 7 Another contemporary writer has criticized the
Board for forcing labor organizations into weak "contract unionism" and excluding an alternate view of union activity based on the principles of industrial
democracy.108 Most tellingly, one major study concluded that "the outlines of
modern grievance arbitration were dear long before the war" and that the
wartime no-strike pledge, rather than the WLB, forced labor and management
to rely more heavily on arbitration.1 0 9
The traditional and revisionist views of the relationship between the WLB
and labor arbitration do not conflict as clearly as may first appear. After reviewing the history of labor arbitration, no one could deny that arbitration was
solidly established before the Second World War and would have continued
to develop even without the WLB. 0° Nor would even the sharpest critics of
the War Labor Board deny its boost to the popularity and use of labor arbitration. The contributions of the Board to labor arbitration were chiefly of three
types: increases in the number and percentage of labor agreements containing
105. Id. at 181. See also War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 8(a), 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
106. F. DuL.Es, supra note 58, at 344.

107. It is my considered opinion that, if we had not had the NWLB in the 1940s, we
might even have advanced sooner toward more sophisticated industrial relations between employers and unions ....
[I]t became apparent to me . . . that the decisions
of the NWLB did nothing but antagonize my clients and make them more resistant
to the labor union demands.

Ropella, A Discussion, 33 LAB. L.J. 531, 531-32 (1982).
108. Lichtenstein, Industrial Democracy, Contract Unionism, and the National War
LaborBoard, 33 LAB. L.J. 524 (1982).
109. Jacoby & Mitchell, Development of Contractual Featuresof the Union-Management
Relationship, 33 LAB. L.J. 512, 516-17 (1982). The authors do admit that the WLB "provided
additional pressure and guidance without which arbitration might have grown more slowly."
In their view the WVLB was only a "contributing influence" on the spread of arbitration, not
the "major impetus" for this development. Id. at 516-17.
110. Nolan &Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2.
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arbitration clauses; refinement of certain arbitration concepts and rules; and
creation of a larger pool of experienced arbitrators.
The exact percentage of contracts with arbitration clauses is difficult to
determine because the agreements are not recorded in a central file. By one set
of figures, the percentage rose from 62 percent before World War II to 73 percent in 1944.111 By another set, the percentage grew from 76 percent in the
pre-War period to 85 percent in the immediate postwar era.' 12 There is agreement on the upward trend, and on the WLB's partial responsibility for it. To
the extent the increase can be attributed to the WLB, its impact was notable
if not overwhelming.
Some of the Board's refinements of arbitration concepts and rules have already been discussed, such as the limitation of the arbitrator's contractual
authority and the presumption of an award's validity on review.113 As the first
major arbitration board of general jurisdiction, the WLB inevitably faced
a myriad of issues endemic to every arbitration system. Its resolutions of those
issues were often the first recorded decisions on point. Moreover, because WLB
decisions were published and widely distributed, they were destined to be influential.,1 4 Later arbitrators could hardly ignore War Labor Board principles,
even though legally they might be free to depart from them.
The Board prescribed methods for an individual to settle grievances
apart from a union as well as the proper use of time limits in a grievance procedure. The Board explored the relative merits of permanent versus ad hoc
arbitrators and the possible methods for selecting an arbitrator. To increase
voluntary arbitration and decrease management fears of impingement on
managerial prerogatives, the WLB carefully defined the arbitrator's jurisdiction
and strictly enforced jurisdictional limitations. It also specifically defined
grievance arbitration as an adjudicatory process, "limited in jurisdiction and
limited to an award based solely on the evidence presented at a hearing."11 5
Thus the Board not only encouraged arbitration generally, it established a
particular model of arbitration. This was the judicial model rather than a
mediatorial one. The Board's establishment of the judicial model during the
War was a major factor in that model's postwar domination.116 Both as to
R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 13, 18.
112. Jacoby & Mitchell, supra note 109, at 515. The current percentage is 97%. See
supra note 3.
113. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
114. For example, the Board found it necessary to clarify the definition of a grievance.
Its conclusion was that absent specific language to the contrary, grievances include all
complaints over the interpretation or application of the agreement. This became the standard
definition of modern arbitration. In this way the Board permanently "sharpened the distinction between 'rights' and 'interests.' Henceforth it would be clear that the commitment
of the parties was to grievance arbitration, not to arbitration of the terms of a new agreement
or to substantive issues not covered by the contract." R. FLEMING, supra note 4, at 19. See also
M. DERBER, supra note 69, at 385-86.
115. B. LANDIS, VALUE JUDGMENTS IN ARBITRATION 5, 6 (1977).
116. A. PRAsow & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLEcrIVE BARGAINING 13 (3d ed. 1983).
This point is established in much greater detail in Harris, "The Snares of Liberalism?
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Shaping of Federal Labor Relations Policy, ca. 1915-1945"
(unpublished paper delivered at the Colloquim on Shop Floor Bargaining and the State in

111.
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substance and procedure, then, the Board's role as a leader in labor arbitration
was unique."1
Perhaps the Board's most important contribution to modem labor arbitration was the development of a body of experienced arbitrators, many of whom
remained active after the War. There were few skilled labor arbitrators before the War and few of those viewed arbitration as a profession. Hundreds
of new people served as arbitrators during World War II, either on
the Board's staff, its disputes panels, or as a result of selection by parties sent
to arbitration by the WLB. In addition, the Board created a continuing
long-term demand for the arbitration services of these people. Management
and labor needed their expertise to operate the labor relations system bequeathed by the WLB. 11s Seven years after the War, Edwin Witte accurately
stated that the "great majority of the labor arbitrators of the present day
gained their first direct experience in service on the staff of the War Labor
9
Board or on its disputes panels."".1
That remained true for many years thereafter.
Of greater importance than the percentage of WLB alumni among current
arbitrators is their quality. The mere listing of WLB staff members who
continued in arbitration after the War should impress anyone familiar with
arbitration. 20 Truly these men constituted "the hard core of the arbitration
profession" up to the present day.' 2 1 Without the experience and expertise of
these men, grievance arbitration may not have been so readily accepted.
Any evaluation of the WLB must consider all these effects. Together their
impact on labor arbitration was immense. The War Labor Board, it is fair
to conclude, was the most important single influence on the maturation of labor
arbitration in America.

II. THiE CHANGING LEGALa ENVIRONMENT SINCE WORLD WAR TWO
The basic structure of modem American labor arbitration was firmly established by the end of World War II. Postwar developments, particularly SuHistorical and Comparative Perspective at Kings College Research Center, Cambridge,
England, on September, 1982).
The dark side to the Board's establishment of the judicial model was that unions found
themselves confined by that model. In contract matters, the union's role became strictly
reactive. The merits of the union's position would be determined in legalistic proceedings
based on principles of interpretation, rather than on economic power or abstract standards
of justice. See Harris, supra,at 20-21.
117. M. DERmB, supranote 69, at 886.
118. Harris, supranote 116, at 21.
119. E. Wir, supra note 4, at 58.
120. The following is a brief sampling drawn from a listing of WLB personnel at 2
TEar. RE'., supra note 63, at 5-46. Many of the persons listed held two or more posts with
the Board. Many others of equal distinction served on arbitration panels without formal staff
appointments: Benjamin Aaron, Rev. Leo C. Brown, S. J., David L. Cole, G. Allen Dash, Jr.,
Carroll R. Daugherty, John T. Dunlop, Samuel Edes, Nathan P. Feinsinger, Sylvester S.
Garrett, Jr., Lewis M. Gill, Clark Kerr, Theodore W. Kheel, John Day Larkin, Wayne Morse,
Eli Rock, Peter Seitz, Ralph T. Seward, Harry Shulman, William E. Simkin, George W.
Taylor, Saul Wallen, W. Willard Wirtz, Edwin E. Witte, and David A. Wolff.
121. R. FLEMInO, supra note 4, at 19.
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preme Court decisions interpreting section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,1 have
shaped the relationship between arbitration and other institutions without
altering that fundamental structure. Indeed, the basic nature of labor arbitration is so well established that radical change is improbable in the foreseeable
future.
The factors contributing to the maturation of labor arbitration since
1945 do not lend themselves to a simple chronology and are better analyzed
thematically. The three most important themes are: the changing legal environment within which arbitration operates; the development of a coherent
theory of labor arbitration; and the professionalization and differentiation
of the arbitration process. This section deals with the first of those themes.

The Labor-Management Conference;
President Truman's LegislativeRequests
Like President Wilson before him, President Truman foresaw that the end
of the War could generate considerable labor strife. Millions of demobilized
soldiers and sailors needed to be reintegrated into the peacetime economy.
Government demand for goods and services would decline precipitously.
Pent-up demand for consumer goods, fueled by savings from wartime wages,
would explode before industries completed the reconversion process. Unions
would attempt to maintain the gross earnings of employees accustomed to
overtime work, while trying to restore the purchasing power that employees'
hourly wage rates had lost to inflation. Legal restrictions on wages and strikes
could not be continued once the reasons for their adoption had disappeared.
President Truman began the transition to normal labor relations by easing
wage control restrictions just two days after the Japanese surrender. Wage increases were allowed provided they would not result in higher prices. The
President urged both labor and management to continue the no-strike, nolockout pledge until a labor-management conference later in the year could
fashion new machinery to minimize strikes during reconversion. Neither side
was receptive to Truman's request. Labor was not willing to renew the nostrike promise, having chafed under the wartime pledge for almost four years,
and employers were not eager to follow WLB orders any longer than necessary.
Even WLB members realized the agency had completed its mission and were
resolved to end its existence by the beginning of 1946.123
Moral and patriotic imperatives that limited wartime labor disputes carried
little weight after Japan surrendered, and workers embarked upon the greatest
wave of strikes in the country's history. Walkouts began while the WLB still
existed, and thus were technically illegal. Legal or not, there was no practical
way to stop them and strike statistics rose. In September 1945, over four million
man-days were lost due to strikes, compared to an average of two million
during the War, and the number reached eight million in October. Less than
one-tenth of one percent of monthly working time was lost to4 strikes early in
1945, but by fall more than one percent was lost each month.12
122. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, § 301, 61 Stat. 156, 157 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)).
123. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 217-18.
124. Id. at 221.
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The President hoped a national conference could create a mechanism for
resolving labor disputes. Truman scheduled a Labor-Management Conference
on Industrial Relations to convene in Washington in November of 1945.125
Like President Wilson's conference twenty-six years earlier, 26 this meeting
deadlocked on fundamental issues. The Conference did, however, unanimously

approve a committee report on existing collective agreements which strongly
endorsed grievance arbitration. The report recommended that the parties
agree to resolve disputes through arbitration if settlement could not otherwise
be reached. The committee further suggested the arbitrator be authorized only
to interpret and apply the agreement's existing provisions to the specific dispute. The report also provided that both parties should agree in advance to
be bound by the arbitrator's decision.17
The Conference unanimously adopted another report recommending that
the Labor Department's Conciliation Service cease providing free arbitration
services. This recommendation was designed to maintain a sharp distinction
125. The best reports of this conference are Labor-Management Conference on Industrial
Relations, 62 MONTHLY LAB. RaV. 37 (Jan. 1946) [hereinafter Labor-Management Conference],
and H. MILLs & E. BROWN, FRoM THE WAGNER ACr To TAr-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 306-11 (1950).
126. Nolan & Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 408-09.
127. Labor-Management Conference, supra note 125, at 42.
IV. The parties should provide by mutual agreement for the final determination
of any unsettled grievances or disputes involving the interpretation or application of
the agreement by an impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board. In this connection the agreement should provide:
(a) A definite and mutually agreed upon method of selecting the impartial
chairman, umpire, arbitrator or board;
(b) That the impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should have no

power to add to, subtract from, change or modify any provisions of the agreement but
should be authorized only to interpret the existing provisions of the agreement and
apply them to the specific facts of the grievance or dispute;
(c) That reference of a grievance or dispute to an impartial chairman, umpire,
arbitrator, or board should be reserved as the final step in the procedure and should
not be resorted -to unless the settlement procedures of the earlier steps have been
exhausted.
(d) That the decision of the impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board
should be accepted by both parties as final and binding.
(e) That the cost of such impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should
be shared equally by both parties.
Paragraph V made it dear that arbitration was not expected to be the normal method
of resolving interest disputes.
V. Any questions not involving the application or interpretation of the agreement
as then existing but which may properly be raised pursuant to agreement provisions
should be subject to negotiation, conciliation, or such other means of settlement as the
parties may provide: ....
Id. The significant aspect of this paragraph is the omission of any express endorsement of
arbitration for such matters.
Paragraph VII expressly rejected a compulsory arbitration system: "Nothing in this
report is intended in any way to recommend compulsory arbitration, that is, arbitration not
voluntarily agreed to by the parties." Id.
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between conciliation and arbitration and to prevent premature use of arbitration simply because it cost the parties nothing. Instead, the Conference
suggested that the Conciliation Service's Division of Arbitration compile a list
of qualified arbitrators to be retained and paid by the parties on a per diem
basis.1 28 Following these recommendations, the Conciliation Service prepared
a national roster of 200 arbitrators and submitted panels of names from this
1

roster on request.

29

The Conference was unable to agree on a method to prevent work stoppages
and resolve disputes, 130 which was the President's main concern. Receiving no
help from the Conference and troubled by the increasing frequency and
severity of strikes, Truman asked Congress for additional powers over labor
disputes affecting the nation. During 1945 and 1946, he unsuccessfully sought
to
authority to order a "cooling-off" period before a strike could begin and 131
establish factfinding machinery similar to that of the Railway Labor Act.
Meanwhile organized labor had grown from ten and a half million members
at the start of the War to almost fifteen million at its close, and it continued
to attract new members.13 2 Labor's economic strength increased proportionately.
In time this new strength caused a backlash resulting in restrictive legislation
at both the state and federal levels.
State Compulsory ArbitrationLegislation
Even under the best circumstances major strikes typically cause some public
inconvenience. During wartime almost any strike appears unpatriotic if not
actually treasonous. Thus, not surprisingly, several states passed laws to curb
strikes during World War It as other states had done during World War 1.133
128. Id. at 43.
129. Gordon, Recent Developments in Conciliation and Arbitration, in LABOR IN POSTWAR AMEucA, supra note 60, at 215, 217-18, 227 [hereinafter Gordon, Recent Developments]. The Conciliation Service had created a Labor Management Advisory Committee in
October of 1945. With the aid of that committee the Service made policy changes such as
discontinuing its staff of permanent arbitrators. Free arbitration was eliminated except for
hardship circumstances. Warren, The Conciliation Service: V-J Day to Taft-Hartley, 1 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 351-62 (1948).
130. In this way, experience vindicated the predictions of an unusually clear-sighted
War Labor Board official, Louis Jaffe, that no arrangement would be worked out under
which labor would give up the strike weapon and that compulsory arbitration would not long
survive the War. Jaffe, Post-War Labor Relations: The Contributionsof the War Labor Board,
29 IOWA L. REV. 276, 281-83 (1944).
131. Gordon, Recent Development, supra note 129, at 217-19. He repeated his requests
on January 3rd and January 21, 1946, but to no avail. Even without express statutory
authority, Truman established a number of fact-finding boards in 1945 and 1946. On May
25, 1946, Truman again asked Congress for authority to limit strikes, at least those strikes in
vital industries under government control. At last Congress began to respond. The House and
Senate overwhelmingly passed separate versions of an appropriate bill, but the emergency
ebbed - indeed, the railroad strike was settled moments before Truman addressed Congress and the bill died a quiet death. A different and far more restrictive bill sponsored by Representative Francis Case of South Dakota did pass Congress, but Truman's veto of the bill was
upheld in the House by a narrow margin. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 236-37, 256-58.
132. J. SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 195, 248.
133. On labor disputes legislation during the First World War, see Nolan & Abrams,
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The real surprise was state legislators' reaction to the great wave of strikes after
the War ended. During 1947 state after state passed laws designed to resolve
disputes, limit certain economic weapons, or weaken organized labor. The
most popular legislative subjects were union security, secondary boycotts,
picketing, and pre-strike ballots. 184
Several of the new laws touched on the compulsory arbitration issue. The
great strike wave had affected many businesses, including public utilities.
Utility strikes created a risk to the public health and safety which many
legislators and a substantial part of the general public considered unacceptable.

As a result, much of the 1947 legislation was aimed at controlling the

"emergency" strike problem. 13 5 Legislative provisions typically provided a
cooling-off period preceding utility strikes; factfinding or mediation procedures; state seizure of struck utilities combined with a strike ban; and compulsory arbitration of the underlying dispute.
Like other compulsory arbitration laws, these statutes were largely un-

successful. They interfered with effective collective bargaining and often were
applied when no real emergency existed. 36 Two occurrences mooted the
dispute over the wisdom of these state laws. First, the postwar strike wave
receded and diminished the need for such legislation. Second, the Supreme

Court proclaimed Wisconsin's Public Utility Anti-Strike Law3 unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.13 From that

point, most state compulsory arbitration laws ceased to cover federally regulated industries. 3 9

Early Years, supra note 2, at 407-08. States enacting "curb labor" laws or amendments during
the Second World War included Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Kansas, Minnesota and Wisconsin. A complete summary of state labor relations to legislation
from 1939 through 1947 is given as an appendix to Sutherland, The Constitutionalityof the
Taft-Hartley Law, 1 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 177, 196-205 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as
Sutherland, Appendix].
134. One troubled pro-labor observer provided this talley in 1949:
The year 1947 saw the countermarch [in labor legislation] sweep across the country.
Sixteen states proclaimed a "right to work" or outlawed closed-shop contracts; 21 states
required strike notices and a cooling-off period or banned strikes under certain
conditions; 11 restricted picketing; 12 prohibited secondary boycotts; 10 directed unions
to file an accounting of their finances, or otherwise regulated internal union affairs.
Similar action was taken in most other fields of labor legislation.
Ziskind, Countermarch in Labor Legislation, in LABOR IN Posr-Wa AmElucA, supra note 60,
at 313, 317 (footnotes omitted). Ziskind provides a detailed analysis of those laws. Id. at 661706. See also Sutherland, Appendix, supra note 133.
135. H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR
DIsPurs: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 24 (1966).
136. Northrup & Rowan, Arbitration and Collective Bargaining: An Analysis of State
Experience, 14 LAB. L.J. 178, 190 (1963) ("It would be difficult indeed to find a single instance in which a state arbitration law has been invoked where great peril actually was
threatening a community.").
137. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.50-.65 (1949).
138. Amalgated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Empl. Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Empl.
Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
139. Northup & Rowan, supra note 136, at 189.
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The Taft-Hartley Act and Labor Arbitration
Although the term "arbitration" is scarcely mentioned in the Taft-Hartley
Act, 14 0 several of its provisions have had a profound effect on labor arbitration.
Most of the provisions relevant to arbitration are in Title II of the Act. Three
early sections state a national policy favoring voluntary arbitration to resolve
141
labor disputes. Section 201(b),'
which deals with interest disputes, declares
that the United States' policy is to advance collective bargaining by providing
government facilities "for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration."
Section 203(c) orders the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Services (FMCS) to encourage dispute settlement alternatives if he cannot
resolve a dispute by conciliation.142 Section 203(d)143 deals with grievance disputes and euphemistically indicates a preference for arbitration. This section
states that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon the parties" is "the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
It is unclear why the endorsements of arbitration, particularly grievance
arbitration, were so half-hearted. The original Senate version of section 203(c)
expressly directed the FMCS to encourage and facilitate arbitration if mediation
or conciliation was unsuccessful.44 For unknown reasons this express reference
to arbitration was replaced with euphemisms during the legislative process. 14 5
These early provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act endorsed labor arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism, but only in a peculiarly subtle manner. 14"
Other provisions of the Act deliberately avoided express references to arbitration. Congress was troubled by the same 1945-46 strike wave that caused
many states to adopt compulsory arbitration laws. As a result, Congress included a series of sections in the Taft-Hartley Act under the title "National
Emergencies. ' '147 Like some state laws, the federal law provided for a cooling-off
period during which a factfinding board could operate. The federal law, however, did not provide for compulsory arbitration. If the emergency dispute remains unsettled after the cooling-off period, the parties are free to resort to
economic pressure.
140. The Taft-Hartley Act is officially known as the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 [hereinafter LMRA] and is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1976).
142. Id. § 173(c). The only specific means mentioned for peaceful dispute resolution is a
secret ballot on the employer's last offer. Id.

143. Id. § 173(d).
144. S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(c) (1947), as reported by the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 99, 142-43 (1948) [hereinafter LEGIs. HIsT.].
145. H. MILLIS 9.E. BROWN, supra note 125, at 572.
146. In the area of conciliation, the Taft-Hartley Act created the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, or rather the Act revived the Labor Department's Conciliation
Service as an independent new agency. LMRA, §§ 202-204, 29 U.S.C. §§ 172-174 (1976). The
proponents of this change asserted that a conciliation service should be impartial and the
Labor Department represented the interests of labor. See, for example, the statement of
Senator Taft, 2 LEMGIs.
Hisr., supra note 144, at 1015. In any case, the inter-agency shift did
not have much impact on the arbitration functions of the conciliation service.
147. LMRA §§ 206-210,29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1976).
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Even section 301, the Act's most important section relating to arbitration,
fails to mention arbitration. Because of its importance in later cases, section
301 is quoted in relevant part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents
in the courts of the United States. Any money judgement against a labor organization
in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member of his assets.14s

The omission of any reference to arbitration in a section providing for
court enforcement of collective bargaining agreements does not indicate an
intent to exclude arbitration from the section's scope. Rather, Congress simply
was not concerned about judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses under
section 301 despite the almost universal adoption of arbitration provisions in
existing collective bargaining agreements. The Act's legislative history contains
little comment on this point, though both the House and Senate draft bills
provided that breach of an arbitration agreement would be an unfair labor
practice.1 49 The primary debate over section 301 focused on whether collective
bargaining agreements generally should be legally enforceable by and against
unions.91 0 Hence, enforcement of arbitration provisions was not regarded as a
distinct issue.
Nor does the legislative history provide much insight as to the intended
meaning of section 301. The only guidance legislative history provides is that
unions could sue or be sued in federal courts for violations of collective bargain.
ing agreements. The statute did not indicate what law courts should apply, how
collective bargaining agreements should be interpreted, or what relationship
would exist between the court, the NLRB and the agreement's arbitration

148. Id. §301(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), (b) (1976).
149. H.R. 8020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(l1)(A) (1947), reprinted in I LEGIs. HIsr., supra
note 144, at 36-37; S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a)(6), (b)(4) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGis.
HiST., supra note 144, at 111-12, 114. Opponents did recognize, however, that these provisions
combined with the enforceability of arbitration agreements under § 301 would give rise
to a jurisdictional conflict between the National Labor Relations Board and the federal
courts. S. MiNorrY REP. No. 105 on S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 2, 12-13 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST., supra note 144, at 474-75. This potential conflict was eliminated in
conference in favor of court action for alleged breaches because of a belief that collective
bargaining contracts should be enforced by the usual legal processes and not by the National
Labor Relations Board. H. CoNF. REP. No. 510 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 41-42
(1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. Hsr., supra note 144, at 474-75.
150. See, e.g., S. RE'. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 2, 15-18 (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGis. HuSr., supra note 144, at 421-24.
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procedures. These questions, among others, were left for the courts to answer
on a case-by-case basis.-'
JudicialExpansion of Section 301:
Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy
As section 301 began to be widely used, courts were forced to give it concrete content. It would have been disarmingly simple for courts to interpret
this section as purely jurisdictional, that is, merely as a Congressional attempt
to eliminate the common law procedural roadblocks to suits based on collective
agreements. At common law, for example, unincorporated associations such as
unions were not legal "persons" with the right to sue or be sued. Collective
bargaining agreements often were not regarded as legally-binding contracts
and courts were not receptive to arbitration clauses.152 The legislative history

of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates Congress intended to remove these procedural roadblocks when it enacted section 301.153 In addition, the Supreme
4
Court initially interpreted the scope of section 301 as purely jurisdictional.1
In the first major case interpreting the section, a fragmented Supreme Court
gave section 301 a very narrow reading. Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. , raised the issue of whether section
301 gave federal courts jurisdiction over a suit brought by a union on behalf
of employees. The union sued the employer for refusing to pay accrued wages,
claiming violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Six Justices in three
separate opinions held the section did not confer jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion held that section 301 merely directed federal courts
to treat a labor union as a legal person.1 56 This holding was, in short, that
section 301 was purely procedural and provided no new substantive law to the
federal courts. Justice Frankfurter's interpretation raised two potential
problems for enforcing collective agreements. One was that a purely procedural statute might extend. the federal courts' jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits.

57

The second was that state law would govern all such suits if no

151. So great was the lack of understanding of the section that two otherwise perspicacious
contemporary experts made one of the most inaccurate predictions in labor relations history.
Referring to sections 301 and 303, Harry Millis, former Chairman of the NLRB, and Emily
Clark Brown, an operating analyst for the NLRB and later a Vassar professor, wrote in 1949:
We doubt very much whether these more ready and extended suability provisions
would be of great importance, even to those lawyers who devote much of their time to
practicing labor law. No doubt Section 301 could mean much in some concrete cases,
but it was not likely to be resorted to widely or for long.
H. MILLIS &E. BROWN, supra note 125, at 509.
152.

C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR

AND

THE

LAw 476-97

(3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter

LABOR AND THE LAW].

153. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. Part 2, 15-18 (1947), reprinted in I
HisT., supra note 144, at 421-24.
154. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Empl. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 Us.
437 (1955).
LEGIS.

155.

Id.

156. Id. at 443-49.
157. Id. at 449-52.
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federal substantive law existed,S 8 State law was ill-equipped for such cases
because of the common law's traditional hostility to arbitration.6 9
These difficulties must have been immediately apparent to the Court, for
two years later it reversed itself. In Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama,160 the Court reexamined section 301 and held the
provision was both procedural and substantive. Justice Douglas pointed out
that because section 301(b) expressly granted jurisdiction, section 301(a) must
have been meant to supplement that grant. 161 The legislative history, though
cloudy, demonstrated a Congressional policy which supported sanctions behind
agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes. Thus a purely jurisdictional reading of section 301 would undermine that Congressional policy.62
The Court determined that federal substantive law under section 301(a)
must be fashioned by the courts from the policies of existing national labor
laws.'6 3 By this decision Justice Douglas eliminated both problems engendered
by Westinghouse. If Congress legislated substantively in section 301, no constitutional problem arose by extending federal judicial power to such cases. 16 4
158.
159.

Id. at 448-49.
On the problems with using state law to enforce collective bargaining, see LABoR
AND THE LAw, supra note 152, at 486-87.
160. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
161. Id.at 451-52.
162. Id.at 456 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 456-57. Justice Douglas' opinion gave the federal courts broad scope for
creativity in fashioning the new common law of the collective agreement:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws ....
The
Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points
out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will
lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning
a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem.... Federal interpretation of the federal law
will govern, not state law.... But state law may be resorted to in; order to find the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy.... Any state law applied, however, will be
absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.

Id. (citations omitted).
Professor Gregory's analysis of Justice Douglas' opinion is too pointed to paraphrase and
must be quoted verbatim:
This position is enough to make the legal profession hold onto their hats. What
it amounts to is this: Congress in Section 301, in lieu of its power to write out a set of
substantive rules to govern the enforcement of collective agreements and not wishing
to have the matter covered by common law or state law, simply gave the federal
courts carte blanche to make up a patchwork of law themselves, as long as it turned
out to be consistent with the policies reflected in existing federal labor statutes. It is
unlikely that so much has ever been read into so little before by the Supreme Court. It
is reminiscent of the extraordinarily varied administrative powers turned over by
Congress to the NLRB in the original Wagner Act, although there the grant of power
was backed up by a fairly detailed statute and there was no question that Congress
had intended to have the board do much the sort of things it did do,
LAw, supra note 152, at 486-87,
164. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457,

LABOR AND THE
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Furthermore, federal courts could avoid the inadequacies of state common
law by fashioning a new federal common law.
Thus under Lincoln Mills, courts were instructed to create a federal
common law of collective bargaining agreements. Because almost all agreements contained arbitration clauses, numerous actions were brought in federal
court to compel or avoid arbitration, or to enforce or vacate an arbitrator's
award. The federal common law of the collective bargaining agreement,
stemming from Lincoln Mills, was largely composed of the federal common
law of labor arbitration.
Fashioning this new common law inevitably required more detailed Supreme Court guidance. The Court set forth the definitive guideposts three
years after Lincoln Mills in a trio of cases brought by the United Steelworkers
of America. These cases, collectively referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy,
were United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.,a-5
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 16 6 and

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.167 The first
two involved suits to enforce arbitration agreements and the third was a suit
to enforce an arbitration award. In each case the circuit court had ruled against
the petitioning union and in each case the Supreme Court reversed in an
opinion by Justice Douglas. In the process, the Court firmly established a
preference for arbitration. Perhaps responding to decades of judicial hostility
towards arbitration, 1 68 Justice Douglas may have overstated his position in
these opinions. Nevertheless, his fundamental principles remain embedded in
the law.
The contract in American Manufacturing contained a standard arbitration
clause covering all disputes "as to the meaning, interpretation and application
of the provisions of this agreement." An employee left work because of an
injury and received compensation benefits for a permanent disability. When
he sought to return to work, the employer refused, citing the disability. The
employee filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, but the
employer refused to submit the dispute to arbitration. The union then sued
to compel the employer to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer because the grievance was "a frivolous, patently baseless one, not subject
to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement."' 169
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the national policy favoring
grievance arbitration enunciated in section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act required that the dispute resolution system agreed upon by the parties be given
"full play." The parties' agreement was to submit all grievances to arbitration,
0
not merely those a court may deem meritorious.Y7
The court's role in such a

165. 363 US. 564 (1960).
166. Id. at 574.
167. Id. at 593.
168. E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67
N.YS.2d 317, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947) (refusing to order arbitration because
the court believed the union's case on the issue sought to be arbitrated was not meritorious).
169. 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959).
170. 363 U.S. at 566-67.
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situation is limited to ascertaining whether the grievant's daim is governed
on its face by the contract.7 1 The district court should require arbitration
even of claims it believes to be frivolous because the processing of such claims
"may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant
172
environment may be quite unaware."'
The second case, Warrior & Gulf, involved a similar arbitration clause
covering differences about the agreement's meaning and application. In contrast
to American Manufacturing, this agreement expressly excluded from arbitration "matters which are strictly a function of management." The employer
laid off several employees because it began subcontracting work previously
done by its employees. The company refused to arbitrate the union's charge
that the subcontracting violated the contract, and the union then brought suit

in federal court to compel arbitration. The district court dismissed the complaint,173 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 74 Both courts found that subcontracting was strictly a management
function and therefore not arbitrable.
The Supreme Court in American Manufacturing had broadly considered
the district court's role in a suit to compel arbitration and determined the
district court should order arbitration of a claim that on its face is governed
by the contract. Warrior & Gulf posed two narrower questions: what is the
court's role when faced with an express exclusion from arbitration; and how
should such an exclusion be interpreted?
Citing the national policy favoring grievance arbitration, the Court distinguished commercial arbitration cases which read arbitration agreements
narrowly. The Court reasoned that arbitration in commercial cases replaced
litigation whereas labor arbitration replaced industrial strife. Distinguishing
the commercial situation further, the Court commented that arbitration under
labor agreements was part of the collective bargaining process itself. 75 Collective bargaining should lead to industrial self-government and ultimately
should regulate "all aspects of the employment relationship."' 76 Not every
problem can be foreseen, of course. Arbitration solves the unforeseeable by
creating a system of private law that will consider the parties' varying interests.
The parties choose a trusted arbitrator to understand their needs and to
examine considerations not expressed in the contract. Judges do not have
the same experience or information, so they lack that special competence 7
171. The Court stated:
[The district court's function] is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether
the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the
arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the
arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was
bargained for.
Id. at 568.
172. Id.
173. 168 F. Supp. 702, 703 (SMD. Ala. 1958).
174. 269 F2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959).
175. 363 U.S. at 578.
176. Id. at 580.
177. Id. at 581-82.
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In response to the first question, Justice Douglas emphasized that apart from
matters the parties specifically exclude, all other disputed issues come within
an arbitration provision's scope. Hence, a court should not deny an order to
arbitrate "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted disputes." 178
In response to the second question, Justice Douglas' answer was equally
unequivocal. Exclusion clauses should be read narrowly and doubts should
be resolved in favor of arbitration. 17 9 One reason for this deliberate bias is that
the employer's agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for the union's agreement not to strike during the term of the contract.180 If the contract includes,
as this one did, an "absolute" no-strike clause, then "in a very real sense"
every employer action is subject to the agreement and thus to arbitration.",
Applying this presumption of arbitrability to the exclusion clause at issue,
Justice Douglas concluded the phrase "strictly a function of management" referred only to those items which the agreement gave to management's "complete control and unfettered discretion." The Court found the agreement in
Warrior & Gulf did not expressly give management such control over subcontracting. The Court further stated that absent an express provision excluding the particular grievance from arbitration, overwhelming evidence of a
8 2
purpose to exclude the claim is required.
The first two trilogy cases also address the important issue of whether the
court or the arbitrator should decide arbitrability questions. Taken to the
fullest extent, Justice Douglas' opinions might demand the arbitrator determine
arbitrability because that question requires interpretation of the contract and
the parties bargained for the arbitrator's judgment rather than that of the
court. 18 3 In the two cases, however, Justice Douglas decided that the courts
should determine arbitrability. A party asserting that the arbitrator should
decide arbitrability must clearly demonstrate that was the parties' intent.184 To
support this position, Justice Douglas relied on an article by Professor Archis
bald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration.'"
Because that article does not
fully support the Court's actions in the first two trilogy cases and because
Justice Douglas' position could result in a "no man's land" of contract interpretation, the issue deserves discussion.
178. Id. at 582-83.
179. Id. at 583.
180. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. Justice Douglas' quid pro quo assertion was made
without citation of legal or empirical authority, but that did not keep him from using it
in the Trilogy as if it were an unquestionable fact.
181. 363 U.S. at 583.
182. Moreover, the court should "view with suspicion" any attempt to persuade it to
find a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration because an attempt to find such a purpose
would necessarily involve the court in the merits of the case. Id. at 584-85. Justice Douglas' preference for arbitration was vindicated by the ultimate arbitration award in the case. Arbitrator J. Fred Holly agreed the dispute was arbitrable and found that the employer had violated
the contract by the challenged subcontracting. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 36 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 695 (1961).
183. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
184. 363 U.S. at 583 n.7.
185. 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959).
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The Cox article concluded that where an arbitration clause covers only
disputes about the "interpretation or application" of the contract, the court
should decide arbitrability. Cox reasoned that the choice of such a clause,
rather than a broad clause covering any dispute between the parties, indicates
a desire to confine the arbitrator's power. The parties' intent would be defeated
if the arbitrator himself was given "unlimited power to determine his own
jurisdiction. 86 This conclusion does not justify the Supreme Court's position.
Cox presumed that some authority had power to investigate the contract
thoroughly before determining which issues the parties agreed to arbitrate. The
only question Cox addressed in the cited passage was which authority, court
or arbitrator, would make that investigation.
Under the Supreme Court's view, the district court should not thoroughly
investigate the arbitrability issue. Rather, the court is limited to determining
whether the grievance is "on its face" governed by the contract. In other words,
the district court is confined to conducting a superficial investigation. Such a
limited inquiry is inconsistent with the Cox analysis which presumes that a
full investigation will be conducted. If the court must determine an arbitrability
issue because it is too important to leave to the arbitrator, then surely that
issue is too important to be resolved by the court on a facial analysis.
American Manufacturing and Warrior & Gulf can be read in two ways,
giving different answers to whether the court or the arbitrator has the decisive
voice on substantive arbitrability issues. The first reading takes Justice Douglas
at his literal word that "the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide."''1 7 Under this approach, once a court has spoken, the arbitrator can
make no contrary determination. Although this reading better comports with
the language of the two decisions, it is undesirable because it would create an
area of the agreement which cannot receive a full and unbiased interpretation.
The arbitrator may not conduct a full investigation if substantive arbitrability
is a question solely for the district court. The district court may not do so
either because it is instructed to resolve this issue facially with a disposition
favoring arbitration. At least three members of the Court recognized this
dilemma and indicated that the district court should make a broader inquiry
if an exclusion exists.188 That is not the holding of the cases, however, and the
no man's land problem remains.
An alternative reading of the two cases would eliminate the no man's land
problem by treating the district court's role as a preliminary one. Under this
approach, the court's task is to determine whether the matter raised in the
grievance is "arguably arbitrable"; that is, whether it falls within the general
class of issues that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. If the district court
finds the dispute arguably arbitrable, the arbitrator himself must decide if
the matter is in fact arbitrable. Because the arbitrator may review the question
de novo, the no man's land problem is eliminated. This second reading is less
faithful to Justice Douglas' words, but it more closely reflects his general approach in the Trilogy.18 9
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1508-10.
363 U.S. at 583.
Id. at 571-72 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Harlan and Frankfurter, JJ.).
Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory are Numbered, 2 INus. REL. L.J. 97,.104-
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The third trilogy case, Enterprise Wheel, concerned judicial review of an
arbitrator's award. The underlying issue was whether courts have more freedom
to interpret a contract after the arbitrator has spoken than before. The dispute
prompting arbitration in Enterprise Wheel arose when several employees were
discharged. An arbitrator found the discharges breached the agreement and
ordered reinstatement with back pay. The collective bargaining agreement
had expired before the arbitration award was issued, and the employer refused
to comply with the award. The union successfully petitioned the district
court to enforce the award. 191 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the reinstatement order was unenforceable because the agreement had expired and that back pay could not be required for the postexpiration period.191
The Supreme Court reversed, holding in effect that courts should defer to
arbitration after issuance of the award as well as before. The Court asserted
that judicial review of the merits of an award would undermine the federal
policy of resolving labor disputes by arbitration. Arbitrators have peculiar
talents, especially in formulating remedies, and the courts should therefore
1 92
avoid undue interference.
Justice Douglas recognized that an arbitrator must not exceed his authority
by dispensing "his own brand of industrial justice." Instead, the arbitrator
is limited to interpreting and applying the collective bargaining agreement. 19'
Justice Douglas' application of those limitations in Enterprise Wheel, however,
reflects a presumption of validity of the arbitrator's award. Although the
arbitrator's award at issue was ambiguous and might have been based upon
legislation rather than upon the contract, Justice Douglas refused to overturn
it:
A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for
refusing to enforce the award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their
reasons for an award. To require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators
to play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be undesirable for a
well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process
9
and aids in clarifying the underlying agreement.1 4

Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy unquestionably expanded
section 301 far beyond the simple meaning of its words. The statutory
provision could have been read simply as granting authority to federal
courts to enforce and interpret collective bargaining agreements. As
interpreted by Justice Douglas, that section instead became a charter to create
05 (1977), suggests an interpretation of the Trilogy that would support this second reading.
Feller argues that the district court must avoid any ruling on the merits of a grievance because it is "incapable" of doing so. He analogizes the situation to the courts of one
jurisdiction attempting to review another jurisdiction's determination. It follows that the
arbitrator should have final authority over matters arguably subject to his jurisdiction.
190. 168 F. Supp. 808, 309 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
191. 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959).
192. 368 U.S. at 596-97.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 598 (footnote omitted).
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a new federal common law applicable only to such agreements. The common
law Justice Douglas created was especially designed to foster grievance arbitration and to insulate the arbitration system from judicial intervention. By this
interpretation of section 301, the Supreme Court radically changed the legal
environment within which arbitration operated, and made arbitration stronger,
more independent, and more mature. With very few exceptions, the funda-

mental doctrines of the Trilogy have been fully accepted by the lower federal
courts. In short, the Supreme Court achieved what it set out to do, and in that
sense the Trilogy has been an almost unqualified success. 95
JudicialExpansion of Section 301: Post-Trilogy Cases
With Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court drew
collective bargaining irrevocably into the web of the law. Prior to the Wagner
Act of 1935, courts seldom dealt with collective bargaining agreements. Even
under the Wagner Act's contractualist philosophy, the legal system's role was
largely limited to ensuring that parties negotiate in good faith over mandatory
subjects. The resulting agreements were of little official concern to the government. Judicial expansion of section 301 resulted in an increased involvement
96
by the courts in enforcing and occasionally interpreting collective agreements.
Many relevant post-Trilogy decisions concern the relationships between
the National Labor Relations Board and the arbitration system, and between
labor unions and employees bound by arbitration clauses. These topics will
be discussed in succeeding sections. This section addresses the major decisions
that either extended the reach of arbitration agreements or increased their
impact. The reach of arbitration agreements was extended during the 1960s
and 1970s both in terms of the parties covered and the time period during
which the parties remained subject to the agreement. The first aspect involves
"successorship" and the second involves "termination." The two aspects are
not entirely distinct but can profitably be discussed in turn.
The typical successorship case involves one employer transferring to another, by sale or merger, all or part of a bargaining unit. In the leading
successorship case, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.,19 Interscience
Encyclopedia was party to a collective bargaining agreement with District 65
of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union. Interscience subsequently merged with Wiley and ceased to do business as a separate entity. The
Interscience employees were employed by the much larger, and nonunion,
Wiley firm. The Union claimed that despite the merger it continued to represent the former Interscience employees. The Union also demanded Wiley
195.

Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, 33 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 331

(1981).
196. This process is described in highly critical tones in Stone, The Post-War Paradigm

in American Labor Law, 90

YALE L.J.

1509 (1981), and in the work of several other practition-

ers of "'critical labor law," a movement described in Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a
New Historiography of Collective BargainingLaw, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 450 (1981). A more
favorable view is presented in Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALiF. L. Rav. 663 (1973). The relative merits of these positions is a fascinating

topic, but goes far beyond the scope of this article and will have to wait for another day.
197. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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recognize certain vested rights of those employees, including seniority and
severance pay. Wiley refused to recognize the Union as a bargaining agent
and the Union filed suit under section 301 to compel arbitration of its claims.
The Supreme Court first declared that the court, not the arbitrator, should
decide whether the arbitration clause of the agreement survived the merger. 98
The Court then held the arbitration clause survived the merger and bound
the successor employer. The basis for the Court's decision is not entirely
clear. The agreement said nothing about successors and Wiley had never
agreed to arbitrate. State law provided that no "claim or demand for any
cause" would be extinguished by a consolidation, but federal law controlled
the issue. The Court concluded that policy considerations favoring arbitration
should not be defeated simply because Wiley did not sign the contract in
question. 1 9 The Court was careful to qualify its decision by stating that the
duty to arbitrate did not always survive a change in corporate structure. For
instance, the Court noted the arbitration duty would not survive where no
"substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise" existed or where
the union might be said to have abandoned its arbitration rights.

20 0

Six years later the dispute finally went to arbitration where the arbitrator
was to decide whether there had been a "substantial continuity of identity in
the business enterprise." Three months after the merger, Interscience employees
had been dispersed throughout the Wiley organization and commingled with
other Wiley employees. Under the substantial continuity test, the arbitrator
held that, at the time of employee commingling, Interscience's separate identity
ceased to exist and the Interscience contract ceased to bind Wiley.20 1 Federal
courts applying Wiley's substantial continuity test in other situations have
examined the portion of the predecessor's assets acquired, the percentage of
the predecessor's employees retained, and whether the acquired business oper20
ated as a distinct entity. '

Later Supreme Court successorship cases caused some confusion about the

o
arbitrability issue. In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,' '

198. Id. at 545-47. The Court held that questions of procedural arbitrability, as opposed
to those involving substantive arbitrability, should be left to the arbitrator. Id. at 557.
199. Id. at 550. The Court also mentioned that the employers' right to rearrange their
businesses must be "balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in
the employment relationship." Id. at 549. The Court cited no authority for this proposition,
however, except for a quick bow to Warrior & Gulf which had emphasized the benefits of
substituting arbitration for economic pressure. This bit of dicta was not again referred to in
the decision.

200. Id. at 551.
201. Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 210, 218 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
Roberts did apply a part of the Interscience contract to Wiley for the period from
merger until the dispersion took place. Id. at 225. In light of the Supreme Court's later
cision in NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), Roberts' decision to apply
Interscience contract appears erroneous. In Burns, the Court held a successor employer is

the
dethe
not

as a matter of labor law bound by its predecessor's contract. Neither labor law nor contract
law principles support the imposition of such a burden on the successor.

202. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 722
(5th Cir. 1974). See generally Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A Re-

consideration of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARv. L. REv. 418 (1968).
203. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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the Supreme Court required a successor employer to bargain with the union
representing the predecessor's employees if those employees constituted a
majority of the new work force. The Court noted, however, that the successor
was not bound by the terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement.
Despite the Court's attempt to distinguish Wiley as a section 301 case and
Burns as an unfair labor practice case,204 Burns cast doubt on the Wiley holding.
The Burns holding that a successor is not bound by a predecessor's contract
is inconsistent with the holding in Wiley that a successor is bound by at least
one very significant provision of the contract if substantial continuity of identity
exists. Burns also conflicts with Wiley's implication that an arbitrator could
find the successor bound by any or all terms of the agreement. 20 5
The Court's distinction between section 301 cases and unfair labor practice
cases was plausible at the time it was made, but the Court subsequently ignored that distinction in Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees.206 Howard Johnson purchased a motel and restaurant in which the
predecessor's employees constituted only a small part of the new work force.
As in Wiley the union brought a section 301 action to compel arbitration.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that Burns must be considered even in a
section 301 case. Emphasizing that Howard Johnson had not hired a majority
of the predecessor's employees, the Court concluded no substantial continuity
20 7
of identity existed and thus no duty to arbitrate arose.
Although Burns and Howard Johnson leave the Wiley holding in existence,
they have virtually destroyed the basis for the holding. The Court's decision in
Wiley that the arbitration clause survived the merger rested on the assumption
that at least some of the substantive rights created by the contract could survive a merger. The later cases demonstrate that the contract ceases to exist
when a successor employer takes over. The practical result is that a successor
may be required to engage in a pointless arbitration proceeding. For example,
the arbitrator could find the substantive rights of the contract did not survive
the merger because a substantial continuity identity between the businesses
was lacking. Even if the requisite continuity existed, the substantive rights
might be unenforceable if as a matter of law the successor is not bound by his
predecessor's agreement.
Wiley involved a second issue that received far less attention at the time but
which has since become of more concern. The union in Wiley brought suit
to compel arbitration a week before the collective bargaining agreement expired, but it sought a remedy which would extend beyond the termination
date. 208 This issue concerns the effect of contract termination on arbitration. In
fact, a series of issues are involved, including whether arbitration must be
initiated before termination; whether the substance of the dispute must involve rights arguably accrued before termination; and whether the arbitrator
204. Id. at 285.
205. D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAw AND PRAcrIcE IN A NurrsH.L 195-96 (1979);
F. BARTOsiC &R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN TM PaivAT' SEcroR 211 (1977).
206. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
207. Id. at 259-60, 264-65.
208. Several of the issues the union sought to arbitrate, as set out in the complaint, posed
questions about rights "now and after January 30, 1962." 376 US. at 552.
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may issue an award continuing contractual rights beyond the termination
20 9
date.
The Wiley Court perfunctorily disposed of the termination issue by treating the dispute solely as one over accrual of rights. The union, however, sought
210
continuation of rights and not merely enforcement of already accrued rights.

Because the union's claims were arbitrable, the arbitrator had to decide whether
the parties had in fact agreed to the accrual of the claimed rights. The arbitrathat the subtor took a restricted view of the parties' intentions, and held
211
contract.
the
of
termination
the
survive
not
did
stantive rights
212
in
The Supreme Court again considered post-termination arbitration
21s
Union.
Workers
Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery
The parties had entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing a
provision for severance pay. The employer closed the plant after the contract
expired and refused to arbitrate subsequent claims for severance pay. The
Court held the dispute arbitrable notwithstanding the expiration of the
contract. The Supreme Court recognized in dicta that courts should not
compel arbitration of disputes that a party has not agreed to arbitrate. Nevertheless, the Court applied the Steelworkers Trilogy test that an order to arbitrate should not be denied absent clear evidence that the arbitration agree21
ment was not intended to cover the dispute. 4 The result is consistent with a

strong presumption of arbitrability to strengthen the arbitration system and
5
to save the federal judiciary from involvement in numerous minor disputes.21
209. For an illuminating discussion of several problems in this area, see Goetz, Arbitration
After Termination of a Collective BargainingAgreement, 63 VA. L. REv. 693 (1977). See also
Stulberg, Survival of the Agreement to Arbitrate:How Long, N.Y.U. 36TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB.
at 10-1 (1983).
210. 376 U.S. at 552. The Court stated:
it is reasonable to read the claims as based solely on the Union's construction of the
Interscience agreement in such a way that, had there been no merger, Interscience
would have been required to discharge certain obligations notwithstanding the expiration of the agreement. We see no reason why parties could not, if they so chose,
agree to the accrual of rights during the term of an agreement and their realization
after the agreement had expired.
Id. at 555.
211. Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.).
According to the arbitrator, the agreement terminated on January 12, 1961, when the predecessor's employees were commingled with the successor's employees, rather than on the stated
expiration date of the agreement. Id. at 218.
212. See also Piano & Musical Instrument Workers Local 2549 v. W. W. Kimball Co.,
379 U.S. 357 (1964) (per curiam), rev'g, 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964). The Circuit Court
held inarbitrable a claim for reinstatement of laid off employees that arose after the termination of the contract. 333 F.2d at 765. Citing American Manufacturing and Wiley, the Supreme
Court reversed without explanation. The Supreme Court later interpreted Kimball as rejecting any distinction between cases arising before and those arising after termination, so long
as they at least arise under the contract. Nolde Bros. Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 249, 252, reh. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977); cf. Goetz,
supra note 209, at 704-05.
213. 430 US. 243, reh. denied, 430 U.S. 988 (1977).
214. 430 US. at 252-55; Goetz, supra note 209, at 704-05.
215. Goetz, supra note 209, at 729. The termination issue continues to stimulate litigation.
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While the Wiley line of cases extended the reach of arbitration agreements, a
second line of post-Trilogy cases increased the impact of arbitration agreements. Beginning with Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 2 16 the Supreme
Court increased the significance of arbitration agreements by giving them
consequences the parties may not have considered or foreseen. Lucas Flour
held that a no-strike clause will be implied from an agreement to arbitrate.
Thus a union choosing to strike over a dispute it had agreed to arbitrate
would be liable for damages caused by the strike. Alternatively, the availability
of arbitration will deprive an employer of its statutory right to sue for damages
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement; if the contract allows the employer to refer a claim to7 arbitration, a court will stay a section 301 damage
21
suit pending arbitration.
The most significant decision in this second line of cases is Boys Markets,Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 770.218 Boys Markets alleviated an anomalous situation
that was caused by three inconsistent Supreme Court decisions. In Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court held that the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2- 9 prohibited a federal district court
from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement.220 Later
that year, the Court in Dowd Box v. Courtney held that state courts had
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over section 301 suits. 221 State courts
had to apply federal law but presumably retained their own procedural and
remedial law. One difficulty with concurrent jurisdiction was that state courts
were not directly limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 22 and some states allowed specific enforcement of no-strike agreements. In other words, state
courts, exercising jurisdiction under a federal statute and applying federal
substantive law, could enjoin strikes even though federal courts were prohibited from doing the same.
This approach, although impractical, would have been logical but for one
complicating factor. Under Avco Corp. v. 1AM Lodge 735,223 a union sued in
a state court for breaching a no-strike clause could avoid an injunction by
removing the case to the federal courts. The combination of the Sinclair,
Dowd Box and Avco decisions created an untenable situation. The Court in
Dowd Box held that Congress intended section 301 to supplement rather than
displace state court jurisdiction in collective bargaining agreement cases. Yet,
of state
in Avco and Sinclair, the Court permitted a de facto displacement
224
injunctive power by allowing unlimited removal to federal courts.
The NLRB recently heard oral arguments on a case in which the employer argued that
Nolde Bros. applied only to accrued or vested rights and did not require arbitration of disputes first arising after expiration of the contract. 237 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 8,

1983).
216. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
217. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 US. 254,264 (1972).

218. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
219. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

370 U.S. 195 (1962).
568 U.S. 502 (1962).
29 US.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
890 U.S. 557 (1968).
D. NoLAN, supranote 205, at 54-55 (1979).
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To resolve this dilemma, the Court in Boys Markets reversed Sinclair,
subject to certain limitations. The Court held that where the parties provided
for mandatory grievance arbitration, federal courts could enjoin a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause if employees were striking over a grievance that
"both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate"; the employer was willing
to arbitrate; normal equity requirements for issuing an injunction were met;
and the employer was required to arbitrate as a condition for obtaining the
injunction.225
Subsequent cases have both broadened and limited the impact of Boys
Markets. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW 226 represents the broadest reach of the
Boys Markets doctrine. The collective bargaining agreement in that case
contained a mandatory arbitration clause but not an express no-strike clause.
In Lucas Flour, the Supreme Court held that a no-strike clause would be
implied from a mandatory arbitration clause and breach of the implied nostrike clause would make a union liable for damages.2 27 Gateway Coal extended
this holding to injunction actions. Henceforth, a union agreeing to a mandatory arbitration clause would be held to have agreed impliedly not to strike
over matters subject to that clause. Strikes in violation of that implied agreement could be enjoined.
Unions have extended the reach of Boys Markets by seeking to enjoin employers from changing contractual terms prior to arbitration. Unions have
enjoyed considerable success in such "reverse Boys Markets" or "status quo
injunction" cases, especially in plant closure or removal situations, and when
employers have attempted to change work rules unilaterally.28 This union
success has redressed some of the unfairness resulting from the resurrection of
the labor injunction. The success, however, has also reduced the possibility
that Boys Market might be overruled or legislatively changed.
The Supreme Court placed additional limits on the Boys Markets doctrine
in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America229 An employer sought
225. 398 U.S. at 253-54.
226. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
227. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See supra notes 216-17.
228. See, e.g., IAM Local Lodge 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981)
(employer enjoined from selling assets pending arbitration of a union grievance over a
successorship clause); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d
Cir. 1979) (employers enjoined from terminating insurance coverage); Teamsters Local 71 v.
Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979) (employer enjoined from further encumbering capital assets during partial liquidation). See
generally Kratzke, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration: Some Misconceptions and
Clarifications,24 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 92 (1979); Payne, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration
-From M-K-T to Greyhound and Beyond, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 169 (1979); Gould, On Labor
Injunctions Pending Arbitration:Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. Rav. 533, 552-61 (1978).
Despite the apparent equity of allowing unions as well as employers to have access to the
injunction remedy, a strong argument can be made that the theory behind Boys Markets does
not work in reverse. See Kratzke, supra. This doubt about the validity of "reverse Boys
Markets" injunctions is confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397 (1976). That case held that an injunction may be issued
only to enforce the promise to arbitrate because other clauses are not specifically enforceable.
If that is so it may be inappropriate to grant a "status quo" injunction even as a form of
interim relief.
229. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
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to enjoin a union from ordering members of two bargaining units to honor
the picket lines of a third bargaining unit which was negotiating a new contract with the employer. The sympathy strike itself violated the collective
bargaining agreement and thus was subject to arbitration; however, the underlying cause of the strike, the third bargaining unit's failure to achieve its objectives in negotiations, was not subject to arbitration. In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled that Boys Markets did not authorize injunctions against
sympathy strikes because such strikes were not "over" an arbitrable issue.
Sympathy strikes would neither frustrate the arbitration process nor deprive
the employer of the benefit of his bargain, which was to secure the union's
promise not to strike over arbitrable disputes.
Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge may appear to be inconsistent.230 The same
policies that led the Supreme Court in Boys Markets to create an exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, promoting arbitration and protecting an employer's contractual right to be free from strikes, also support injunctions against
sympathy strikes. In a broader sense, though, Buffalo Forge reinforces the
essence of Boys Markets, that injunctions are available to protect an agreed
arbitration process but not to enforce contract provisions generally. When
the union cannot bring the underlying dispute to arbitration, there is no persuasive reason to override the express language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Moreover, Buffalo Forge places some rational limits on the issuance of Boys
Markets injunctions. These limits prevent overuse of the labor injunction and
make the Boys Markets decision less vulnerable to attack.
Overall, the post-Trilogy cases have vastly extended the reach of Lincoln
Mills and the Trilogy. Paradoxically, the web of the law has wrapped tighter
around labor arbitration agreements, yet it has given them unprecedented
strength. Intentionally or unintentionally, the courts put the completing
touches on a system of grievance resolution fostered, but barely envisioned, by
Congress when it enacted section 301 in 1947.
The Duty of FairRepresentation
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)231 in 1935
232
largely to give employees more bargaining leverage with their employers.
Accordingly, the NLRA protected employees' right to organize and to bargain
collectively. The Act also embodied a fundamental characteristic of American
labor law, the "exclusivity principle." Under this principle, a union selected
by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit becomes the
exclusive representative for all employees in the unit.2 s3 Exclusivity was thought
230. D. NoLm, supranote 205, at 59-60.
231. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (also known as the Wagner Act) [codified as amended
as the Labor Management Relations Act at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976)].
232. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
233. Ch. 372 § 9(a), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976)).
The NLRA was not the first law to embody the exclusivity principle. Several 19th century
state arbitration laws contained "majority preference" provisions reflecting the same desire
to strengthen the bargaining position of the designated representative. See Nolan & Abrams,
Early Years, supra note 2, at 381 n.40; Schreiber, Majority Preference Provisions in Early
State Labor Arbitration Statutes-1880-1900, 15 Am. J. LEcAL HbST. 186 (1971). The Rail-
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necessary to enable workers to speak to employers with a single, powerful
voice. This grant of exclusive authority, however, deprived individual employees of the right to bargain through other representatives or even to negoti23
ate individual employment contracts. If labor relations involved only a single conflict between the competing
interests of an employer and all his employees, the unqualified exclusivity
principle makes excellent sense. The concept is less satisfactory when different
interests arise between workers or when the union's interests as an entity
diverge from those of some or all of the employees. These differences inevitably
occur because bargaining units are not homogeneous and because hierarchical
unions often seek objectives that do not always coincide with the interests of
23
their members. 5
The federal courts attempted to resolve this tension between exclusivity
and individualism by requiring those with the right of exclusive representation
to exercise that right fairly. 236 Without this duty an exclusive representative
could discriminate against disfavored employees and, because exclusivity results
from a governmental grant of power, such discrimination would raise serious
constitutional questions. The Supreme Court addressed the problem of discrimination by an exclusive representative in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad.237 The Court interpreted the labor laws as imposing a duty on the
bargaining representative to protect employees' interests in the same manner
as the Constitution imposes a duty upon a legislature to give equal protection
to its constituents' interests.
The Steele controversy stemmed from contract negotiations by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. The Brotherhood, the duly
certified representative of all the railroad's firemen, refused to admit any black
members and negotiated to exclude black firemen from employment. The Court
interpreted the Railway Labor Act as obligating the exclusive representative
to "represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile
discrimination,fairly, impartially, and in good faith."238
The Steele Court expressly recognized that unions lawfully may choose
among policies that affect employees differently, but concluded that unions
way Labor Act of 1926 contained language similar to that of the NLRA. Ch. 691, § 2, 48 Stat.
1186 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)).
234. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
235. Levine & Hollander, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation in Contract Administration, 7 EMPL. REL. L.J. 193, 194 (1981). See generally Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be
Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 897 (1975).
236. Levine & Hollander, supra note 235, at 194.
237. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
238. 323 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). This case was decided on the basis of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), but the same principle was quickly applied to cases arising
under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). See Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1952). All of these cases involved private suits for damages. In 1962, the National Labor
Relations Board held that breach of the duty of fair representation also constituted an unfair
labor practice. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Accord Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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could not act on the basis of irrelevant or invidiously hostile considerations.2 39
Eight years later the Court found a union did not violate the fair representation duty when it negotiated a seniority provision benefiting new employees
at the expense of previously hired employees. 24 0 The Court held that representatives must be permitted a "wide range of reasonableness" provided they act
241
in good faith and with honesty of purpose.
Early fair representation cases involved contract negotiation and emphasized protection of union discretion absent a showing of bad faith or discrimination. Increasingly in the last two decades, the fair representation duty

has been applied to contract administration and to arbitration. In the process,
many federal courts shifted the standard of fair representation from avoidance
of bad faith to avoidance of arbitrary or negligent conduct. This shift may
have increased pressures on unions to arbitrate more grievances and to conduct
arbitrations in a more formal fashion.
In the landmark case of Vaca v. Sipes,242 the Supreme Court ruled that the

duty of fair representation in contract administration was inherent in the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The Court found that a union

did not breach its duty by declining to pursue a dubious grievance to arbitration. Speaking for the Court, Justice White wrote that an individual employee
has no absolute right to have his grievance arbitrated. Repeating the standard
formulation that a breach occurs only when the union's conduct is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith," he added another term to the formulation:
"We accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."243

Although finding no breach of duty in the case, Justice White discussed
the appropriate damages if the union had breached the duty. He concluded
the employer would be liable initially for damages for breach of contract. The
union, however, would be liable for any increase in damages caused by the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation. The significance of this dicta
was not fully apparent until Bowen v. United States Postal Service.244 The
323 U.S. at 202-03.
240. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 45 U.S. 330 (1952). The collective agreement gave new
employees seniority credit for time spent in the armed forces. As a result, some newly-hired
veterans received greater seniority than some employees hired during the War. Id. at 334.
241. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1952). See also Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (Court upheld an agreement dovetailing seniority lists even though
some employees were laid off as a result).
242. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Supreme Court first applied the duty of fair representation
to grievance processing in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), a Railway Labor Act case. In
Conley, discharged black employees vainly appealed to their union for assistance. The Court
stated the duty to represent all workers fairly "does not come to an abrupt end . . . with the
making of an agreement between union and the employer." Id. at 46. The Court held the
union could not lawfully discriminate in carrying over its grievance functions any more than
in negotiating a contract.
243. 386 U.S. at 190-91 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court had hinted that the
perfunctory handling of a grievance would breach the duty of fair representation when it
suggested in dicta that an employee might sue an employer directly without using the
contractual procedures where "the union refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the
individual's claim... " Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
244. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
289.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

Court in Bowen interpreted Vaca as meaning the breaching union would be responsible for damages from the time the employer's breach would have been
corrected had the union not breached its duty of fair representation. This
interpretation could effectively shift the bulk of damages in a given case onto
the union.
More subtle problems occur when the alleged breach of duty consists not
of overt discrimination, as in Steele, or of a failure to act, as in Bowen, but
of a failure to perform competently. For example, in Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight245 the defendant union took the grievances of certain discharged employees to a bipartite committee which functioned as an arbitration board. Because the union had not fully investigated the facts, critical information
never reached the committee. The committee upheld the discharges and the
employees sued both the union and the company. Reasoning that the employer
had acted in good faith, the district court dismissed the action and the court
of appeals affirmed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that a union's breach
of its fair representation duty in processing a grievance removes the bar of
finality to which the arbitrator's decision is otherwise entitled.2 4 6 Unfortunately, the Court provided little guidance concerning the standards for a
union's quality of performance.2 4 7 The Court repeatedly referred to the Steele
standard which prohibits only discrimination and bad faith representation.248
The Court also recognized that grievance processes "cannot be expected to
be error-free,"' 249 but it approvingly cited the broader standard of Vaca, which
finds a breach if the union ignored the complaint or processed it in a "perfunctory" manner.

25 0

Lower courts have experienced difficulty applying these vague and potentially inconsistent standards. 25 1 Before analyzing the standards applied by
federal courts in defining a union's duty, one preliminary distinction should
be noted. Honest mistakes of judgment are more readily pardoned than acts
of negligence. A union will not be held in breach of its duty if, after reviewing
245. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
246. Id. at 556.
247. In fact, the Court did not reach the question of whether or not the Union's
performance in this case passed muster. Id. at 572-73.
248. E.g., id. at 570, 571 (referring to the union's duty to represent employees "honestly
and in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary conduct").
249. Id. at 571.
250. Id. at 569. This broad phrasing seemingly eliminated an earlier suggestion that
positive discrimination is a necessary element in proving a breach of the duty of fair representation. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Empl. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
301 (1971).
251. For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to sketch out the trend of federal
court cases and to indicate the parameters of the duty as applied to arbitration. Supreme
Court guidance is needed to resolve the lingering issues. The reader interested in more
detail will not lack for sources. E.g., T. BoYcE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE
COURTS (1978); THE DUTY OF FAIR REPrSENTATON (J. McKelvey, ed. 1977); Cheit, Competing
Models of Fair Representation: The Perfunctory Processing Cases, 24 B.C.L. Rlv. 1 (1982);
Rabin, The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration, 29 SYrucusE
L. REv. 851 (1978); Vandervelde, A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation
Duty, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1079 (1983).
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the facts of a grievance, it declines to take a dubious case to arbitration.252 If
the union simply neglects to demand arbitration within the contractual period,
however, liability may attach. 253 The same distinction applies to conduct
within an arbitration. Choosing a weak line of argument would not violate
255
the duty,25 4 but failure to investigate alternative approaches may well do so.
The reason for this distinction is apparent: while the union must be granted
a "wide range of reasonableness" in representing a bargaining unit,256 errors
caused by neglect are not within the zone of reasonableness.
In general terms, only three possible standards are applicable to the duty
of fair representation. A union could be liable for breach due to negligence,
gross negligence, or bad faith and actual discrimination. Most federal courts
have chosen the middle path and demand a showing of more than ordinary
negligence but not proof of actual bad faith. This position most nearly reflects the Supreme Court's views and best accords with the realities of a union's
role.
A few courts have indicated that unions may be liable to employees for
negligent errors in processing grievances. The leading example of this interpretation is Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp. [Ruzicka 1].257 In that case, the
Sixth Circuit stated that a union's "negligent" failure to comply with a contractual time limit constituted arbitrary handling of a grievance in breach of
the union's duty. 58 This approach conflicts with the spirit of the Supreme
Court's fair representation decisions. Those decisions describe breach of fair
representation in terms more serious than simple negligence, such as hostile
discrimination and bad faith. The decisions also emphasize the union's need
for a wide zone of reasonableness in which to exercise its representation
functions- O and caution that a breach must involve more than mere errors
260
of judgment.
In addition to conflicting with Supreme Court rulings, the Ruzicka I approach is also unrealistic. Unions operate through thousands of agents, most
of them part-time, unpaid, and untrained. Unions use a grievance and arbitration system designed to avoid the formality and rigidity of the courts.261 To
252. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US. 171, 191-92 (1967).
253. E.g., Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978),
modified, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
254. Griffin v. International Union, UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
255. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 US. 554 (1976).
256. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1952).
257. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
258. Id. at 310. See also Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d
232 (6th Cir. 1978) (duty could be breached by failing to check the applicability of a
contract provision); cf. Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978) (negligent
conduct may in some circumstances breach the duty). This approach has received only slight
scholarly support. See, e.g., Note, Determining Standards for a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1980).
259. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1952); Foust v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 442 U.S. 42, 51 ("union discretion is essential to the proper functioning of
the collective bargaining-system').
260. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976).

261. On the other hand, the arbitration proess must be fundamentally fair in order to
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demand or expect error-free grievance processing is unreasonable and impractical. 262 For these reasons almost all recent decisions have rejected the
2 63
and even the Sixth Circuit has retreated.264
simple negligence approach,

At the opposite extreme, a few other courts have demanded proof of bad
faith before finding a union in breach of its duty. 265 This approach also conflicts with previous Supreme Court expressions. The Supreme Court, while
often speaking in terms of bad faith, has repeatedly used less demanding
terms such as "arbitrary" conduct and "perfunctory" processing of grievances.
Moreover, the bad faith standard places an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs
because workers usually depend on their bargaining representative to process
grievances competently. Requiring workers to prove a union's bad faith in
order to maintain a suit for damages would immunize the most egregious
union errors as long as the union does not overtly discriminate. For these
reasons, most federal courts allow proof of a breach without evidence of actual
66
bad faith.2
As a result, most courts apply the middle standard with a test approximating gross negligence. In grievance handling, the union's conduct must not
be "arbitrary" or "perfunctory." Although employing varying terms, 267 the
warrant its special status under national labor policy. See Abrams, The Integrity of the
Arbitral Process, 76 MIcH. L. RFv. 231 (1977).
262. 424 U.S. at 571 (the grievance process "cannot be expected to be error-free"). See also
St. Antoine, JudicialReview of Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and
Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137 (1977). Professor St. Antoine warned that the principle
"can hardly be faulted as an abstract proposition," but the results "could be mischievous if
the courts become too quick to equate a halting, inexpert arbitration presentation by a lay
union representative with 'bad faith' or 'perfunctoriness.' " Id. at 1155.
263. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1325 (C. Morris, 2d ed. 1983). For example, the
Eighth Circuit in 1980 held flatly that "[mere negligence, poor judgment or ineptitude"
will not establish a breach of the union's duty. NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union,
618 F.2d 1249, 1255 (8th Cir. 1980).
264. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1211 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Ruzicka II").
The retreat has not been a rout, however. In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 707 F.2d 259,
260 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Ruzicka III"), the court upheld dismissal of the fair representation suit
but cited Ruzicka I for the proposition that "good faith errors" do not insulate unions from
liability in § 301 cases.
265. See Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980). "To violate the
duty . . . it is necessary that the union act with a bad faith motive....
In order to state
a claim for breach of this duty, it is essential that plaintiffs allege a bad faith motive on the
part of the union." Id. at 961. See also Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th
Cir. 1983) (requiring proof of intentional misconduct to show union violated its duty of fair
representation). Other cases are cited at 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 263, at
1323 n.180.
266. T. BoYcE, supra note 251, at 34-54.
267. The Fourth Circuit stated that a union representative breaches the duty of fair
representation when he is "so indifferent to the rights of members or so grossly deficient in
his conduct purporting to protect the rights of members that the conduct could be equated
with arbitrary action." Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th
Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit finds a breach by unintentional conduct if it is "so egregious, so
far short of minimum standards of fairness to the employee and so unrelated to legitimate
union interests as to be arbitrary," or if the conduct amounts to "reckless disregard for
the rights of the individual employee," Robesky v. Qantas Empire Airways, 573 F.2d 1082,
1090 (9th Cir. 1978), or if it is "irrational, intentional, or egregiously unfair," Price v.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/1

46

Nolan and Abrams: American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years
1983][

LABOR ARBITRATION: MATURING YEARS

courts are reasonably consistent in granting the union wide discretion provided it exercises reasonable judgment. 21s The union's discretion includes decisions to file or not to file a grievance, or to take or not to take a grievance
to arbitration. The union's discretion also encompasses the choice of bringing
a grievance advantageous to one employee or group, even if it would be disadvantageous to another employee or group. On the other hand, failure to
pursue a grievance for discriminatory reasons, or for no reason at all, will
26 9

breach the duty.

Less obvious are the guideposts regarding the quality of the union's representation in arbitration. A blatant failure to investigate a matter in dispute
is likely to constitute a breach,2 7 0 but the union need not conduct a fully professional investigation.271 The union need not find and use all possible arguments, 272 but ignorance of a crucial contract provision 27 3 or failure to raise
critical points274 could easily amount to arbitrary or perfunctory conduct. In
any case, even perfunctory handling of a grievance will not violate the duty
276
unless it contributed to an erroneous outcome.
The union's duty of fair representation continues even after the arbitration's conclusion, but in a weakened form. The NLRB has held that a negligent failure to seek enforcement of a favorable arbitration award did not
breach the duty of fair representation.27 6 A district court held a union is not
obliged to seek vacation of an unfavorable award because that was not one of
the contractual remedies to which the employee had a right.2 77 In a very
questionable decision, another district court found that a union breached

Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 586 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1978). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
requires conduct which is "so poor as to deprive the plaintiffs of a fair hearing." Connally
v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1978).
268. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (conflicting medical information); King v.
Space Carriers, Inc., 608 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1979) (earlier arbitration award resolved the
matter); Buchanan v. NLRB, 597 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1979) (lack of merit). See generally 2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 263, at 1328-30.
269. 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 263, at 1331-32. See also Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1978), modified, 442 U.S. 42 (1979);
Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. International Union,
United Auto., 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
270. E.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Tatum v. Frisco Transp.
Co., 626 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1980); Beverly Manor Convalescent Center, 229 N.L.R.B. 692 (1977).
271. San Francisco Web Pressmen & Platemakers Union No. 4, 249 N.L.R.B. 88 (1980)
(union need not get explanations from every grievant); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper
Guild Local 35, 239 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1979 (no investigation necessary in light of the union's
reasonable interpretation of the contract).
272. Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975); Jensen
v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 625 F.2d 379
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 US. 916 (1981).
273. Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1978).
274. Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir 1980); Smith v. Hnssman
Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
275. Hardee v. North Carolina Allstate Serv., 537 F2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1976).
276. Truck Drivers Union Local 407, 249 N.L.R.B. 59 (1980).
277. Sears v. Cadillac Auto Co., 501 F. Supp. 1350 (D. Mass. 1980).
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its duty by misinterpreting an arbitration award and negotiating a new
28
contract provision based on that misinterpretation. 7
Only a small proportion of fair representation suits are won by plaintiffs,
but the possibility of large damage judgments is enough to affect union behavior. Many commentators firmly believe that unions now take weak cases to
arbitration that in prior years would have been dropped. 279 The risk of
liability may also cause unions to conduct arbitrations more formally even
though there is no legal obligation to provide an attorney or a transcript.28

The result of applying the duty of fair representation in arbitration proceedings may be to render arbitrations more frequent and more legalistic. This
result is not altogether desirable. If arbitration is to continue serving as a
viable alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes, it must not be transformed into a duplicate of the judicial system. The difficult task facing
arbitrators and courts alike is to balance the rights of individuals and parties
without sacrificing either to the other. In short, arbitration must simultaneously be efficient, informal, and fair.
Arbitrationand the NLRB
The willingness of federal courts to defer to privately negotiated dispute
resolution systems has increased immeasurably the importance of labor arbitration. The National Labor Relations Board has adopted a similar though
less comprehensive policy and also has contributed to the growth of labor
arbitration. Through enforcement of arbitration awards, the courts have discouraged resort to their own processes and encouraged resort to arbitration.
By accepting certain arbitral decisions as conclusive of, or influential on, the
28 1
legal issues before it, the NLRB has indirectly accomplished this objective.
278. Local 4076, United Steelworkers of Am. v. United Steelworkers, 338 F. Supp. 1154
(W.D. Pa. 1972).
279. The best available study of the impact of the fair representation cases on arbitration
is Rabin, supra note 251, but even that is a bit dated. On arbitral opinion, see, e.g., NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 84, interview with G. Allen Dash, Jr., at 45, 49; interview with William E. Simkin, at 23.
280. Cf. Del Casal v. Eastern Air Lines, 465 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. 1979), afj'd, 634 F.2d 295
(5th Cir. 1981) (attorney); but see Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 625 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir.
1980) (transcript); Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 102 L.R.R.M. (E.D. Ark. 1979) (union
obliged to provide an "expert" to represent the grievant when technical issues are in dispute).
281. A few examples illustrate the overlap. Employers must bargain in good faith with
the union before changing terms or conditions of employment. The union, however, may
grant an employer the right to make certain changes without bargaining. Whether a proposed subcontracting plan would violate the employer's obligation to bargain in good faith
may therefore depend on interpretation of a contract's management rights clause. In such
a case the contractual issue will be determinative of the statutory issue.
Employers are prohibited from discharging employees because of their union membership
or activities. A collective bargaining agreement may prohibit similar conduct, or it may
simply require "just cause" for a discharge. The contractual issue may not be determinative
of the statutory issue, but it may be influential.
The Board is charged with determining which union, if any, represents certain employees.
A contract, however, may require assignment of certain work to a particular category of
employee, or may define the scope of a union's representation by reference to work or to
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In these areas of overlap, it may appear that the LMRA's substantive
grant of authority to the Board in contract interpretation cases conflicts with
the Act's stated preference for privately negotiated grievance resolution
systems. The Supreme Court in a series of cases held that Congress intended
the statutory and private systems to overlap. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood
Corp.,2 8 2 for example, the Court affirmed the Board's power to interpret
contract terms, even though Congress had not made breaches of contracts
unfair labor practices. Even where parties had agreed to a mandatory arbitration clause, the Court refused to subject the Board to the mandatory deferral
policy of the Steelworkers Trilogy.28 3 Just as parties to an arbitration agreement may use arbitration notwithstanding the Board's availability to resolve
a dispute, so the Board may interpret and enforce a collective agreement even
if arbitration is available. 28 4 While stating a preference for arbitration,
Congress expressly provided that the Board's power "shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. '28 5 Thus the Board's jurisdiction
cannot be supplanted by the parties to a collective agreement.
The Board has some discretion in deciding when to exercise its jurisdiction, however, and it may therefore voluntarily defer to arbitration. The
strongest case for deferral arises when an arbitrator has already ruled. A
weaker case exists when the injured party has voluntarily invoked the
grievance and arbitration process but the arbitrator has not yet ruled. The
weakest case for deferral is when the grievance process has not been invoked.
The Board has adopted deferral rules for each of these situations.
In a seminal decision on post-arbitral deferral, Spielberg Manufacturing
Co., 2 16 the Board deferred to the decision of an arbitration panel which had
denied reinstatement to four strikers accused of picket-line misconduct. The
Board formulated three criteria which must be met before deferral would be
appropriate: the proceedings must be fair and regular; all parties must agree
to be bound by the award; and the decision must not be repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act. 28s The Board explained that this deferral
categories of workers. Disputes relative to the second situation -which union represents the
workers-are representation disputes subject the Board's jurisdiction. The former typewhich employees are entitled to do the work-are work-assignment disputes subject to the
collective agreement. Lines between these categories are frequently difficult to draw. As a
result, the contractual issue may be determinative of the legal issue, or may only be influential in resolving the legal issue, or may be irrelevant to the legal issue. See also 1 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 263, at 910-13 (discussion of the types of cases in which
the Board may be concerned with interpretation of collective agreements).
282. 385 US. 421 (1967). C & C Plywood did not involve an arbitration clause, but a
companion case did and was resolved in the same way. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 US.
432 (1967).
283. 385 U.S. at 436.
284. Compare Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) with NLRB v.
Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 US. 357 (1969).
285. LMRA, § 10(a), 39 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
286. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
287. Subsequent to Spielberg, the Board added a fourth criterion: the issue involved in
an unfair labor practice case must have been presented to and considered by the arbitrator.
Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471
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policy would facilitate the national labor policy of promoting industrial
peace by encouraging collective bargaining. Arbitration is "part and parcel
of the collective bargaining process itself," said the Board, and awards should
be respected unless the arbitration proceedings were tainted or the result was
28 8
repugnant to the Act.

The Supreme Court has indicated approval of the Spielberg policy, 289 and
in general the federal appellate courts also have been supportive. Some courts
have imposed additional requirements before approving deferral. For example,
several courts have insisted that the arbitral tribunal must "clearly decide"
the issue to which the Board is urged to give deference and the issue must be
one within the tribunal's competence.2 90 As the Board subsumed these new
criteria as its own, 291 its deferral policy became so embedded that courts
2 92
now actually require the Board to defer in some cases.

When a charging party voluntarily submits a matter to a grievance procedure and the case is not suitable for pre-arbitral deferral, the Board will
usually defer decision on the unfair labor practice charge pending completion
of the grievance process. 293 This policy forces an aggrieved person into an
early choice. If a worker actively pursues a grievance, the Board will defer
action pending issuance of an arbitration award. If the worker would rather
have a Board determination, he must forego use of the grievance machinery
or withdraw the grievance already filed. If he opts for the Board and the
charge is not considered meritorious, he may be left with no remedy at all.294
The Board has struggled most with pre-arbitral deferral. Until 1971, the
Board did not require use of a grievance procedure before filing an unfair
labor practice charge; in other words, failure to exhaust contractual remedies

(1st Cir. 1964). Recently the Board has indicated that a general presentation of the facts
necessary to resolve the statutory issue will suffice. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1056 (1984).
288. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 926-27 (1962), enforced sub nom.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
289. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
290. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l,
699 F.2d 806, (6th Cir. 1983); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 536 (9th Cir. 1977) (arbitrator must specifically deal with the statutory issue).
291. In Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), and Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B.
1136 (1982), the Board stated that it would defer only when the statutory issue had been
presented to and considered by the arbitrator. See supra note 287.
292. E.g., NLRB v. Pincus Brothers Inc. - Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980); NLRB
v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979) (Board must defer to some of the
factual issues decided by the arbitral tribunal); Douglas Aircraft v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th
Cir. 1979); American Freight System v. NLRB, 722 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (NLRB abused
its discretion by not deferring to arbitration award where the statutory issue was subsumed
by the contractual issue).
293. This policy was announced in Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963). Ironically
the arbitration award in Dubo was later disregarded by the Board because the arbitration
panel had not considered the statutory issue. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1964),
enforced, 353 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
294. See NLRB Gen. Counsel Memos. Nos. 79-36 (May 14, 1979) and 81-39 (July 17,
1981); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 263, at 936-37.
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would not necessarily bar Board action.295 Collyer Insulated Wire298 dra-

matically changed that situation. A slim majority of the NLRB deferred
action on a union's charge of a failure to bargain. Referring to the congressional preference for private dispute resolution and to arbitrators' special
2 97
skills in deciding matters arising under established bargaining relationships,
the Board stated that pre-arbitral deferral would be appropriate where the
dispute arose "within the confines of a long and productive relationship!' and
there was no claim of anti-union animus; the charged party indicated willingness to arbitrate under an arbitration dause broad enough to cover the dispute before the Board; and the meaning of the contract was central to the
statutory dispute. The Board would retain jurisdiction in case the dispute was
not settled or submitted to arbitration, or if the final arbitration award did
not meet the Spielberg standards. 2 8 The next year, another slim majority of
the Board extended Collyer from refusal-to-bargain cases to cases involving
interference with protected individual rights. 299 Further extensions followed
in the next few years.300
Reviewing courts generally approved the Collyer doctrine. 01 A few courts
have been cautious in granting approval, however. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals indicated, for example, that deferral would be inappropriate when arbitration would impose a severe financial burden on a
party or when arbitration might prevent an orderly resolution of the legal
2
issue.
During the Carter administration and in the early years of the Reagan administration, the NLRB took a much less favorable view of arbitration. The
Board refused to defer to an arbitration award unless the party advocating
deferral demonstrated that the statutory issue had been presented to and
dearly decided by the arbitrator 03 In addition, the Board restricted prearbitral deferral to refusal-to-bargain cases.304 Members Fanning and Jenkins,
the most forceful opponents of deferral, have since left the Board and the newly
constituted majority appointed by President Reagan has taken an aggressively
pro-deferral stance. Recent decisions have once again extended Collyer to

295.

1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 263, at 926.

296.

192 NL.R.B. 937 (1971).

297. Id. at 839.
298. Id. at 84243. Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented vigorously and continued
their opposition to pre-arbitral deferral until they left the Board.
299.

The rights originate from §§ 8(a)(1), (3), 8(b)(1)(A), (2) of the LMRA, National Radio

Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
300.

1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW., supra note 263, at 932-33.

301.

Even the Supreme Court endorsed it, albeit in dictum. William E. Arnold Co. v.

Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16 (1974). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 263, at 933-34.
302. Local 2188, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974).
303. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980); Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B.
1136 (1982).
304. General American Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), overruling National
Radio Co., supranote 299.
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individual rights cases,305 and have deferred to arbitration awards even when
the statutory issue was not expressly presented to or decided by the arbitra3
tor. 06
The Board's shifting policies demonstrate the strength of the arguments
for and against deferral. On the one hand, Congress and the Supreme Court
have repeatedly endorsed grievance arbitration as the preferred method of
settling labor disputes. On the other hand, the NLRA establishes public
rights and obligates the NLRB to protect those rights. Thus the Board should
not ignore arbitration nor should it abdicate its own responsibilities to a
private dispute resolution system. What is required, and what the Board
is struggling to find, is a policy which fosters arbitration of contractual matters
while reserving to the Board statutory matters beyond the special expertise of
arbitrators.
ArbitrationStatutes
As arbitration gained popularity throughout the country, lack of uniform
statutory protection for the arbitration process became more troubling. Some
states had no arbitration laws; others had laws inadequate for the needs
of the contracting parties. In virtually all states, some of the traditional
judicial hostility to arbitration lingered. In the early 1920s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws attempted to draft a uniform
arbitration act to cure these ills. Because so many judges and lawyers regarded
arbitration as an unwelcome competitor with the judicial system, the final
draft did not cover agreements to arbitrate future disputes. This limitation
rendered the proposed law worthless and the Conference quickly withdrew
it. New York, New Jersey, and about fifteen other states adopted some form
30 7
of arbitration statute during this period, but few state laws were satisfactory.
In the 1950s the Conference revisited the subject and adopted a model
"Act Relating to Arbitration and to Make Uniform the Law with Reference
Thereto." The draft was approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association and was amended in 1956. Since then, more than forty states
have enacted laws substantially similar to the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA).o8
The UAA is relatively simple in purpose and procedure. It emphasizes the
validity of arbitration agreements, including those between employers and
305. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1049 (1984),
overruling Suburban Motor Freight and Propoco.
306. In Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 115 L.R.R.M.

(BNA) 1056

(1984),

the

Board stated that it would be sufficient for the contractual and statutory issues to be factually
parallel and presented generally to the arbitrator. The Board also increased the burden on the
party opposing deferral to show that the award was clearly repugnant to the Act.
307. The Proposed Uniform Arbitration Act: A Panel Discussion, 10 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 112, 115-16 (1957) (remarks of Dean Maynard Pirsig). Only four states adopted the
proposed act. Lerner, The Uniform Arbitration Act: 25-Year Retrospective, 186 N.Y.L.J. No.

6, at I (July 9, 1981).
308. See Lerner, supra note 307. The text of the amended act is reprinted in 10 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. AR. 195-200 (1957). The 1956 amendments significantly limited the bases on
which a reviewing court could vacate an arbitration award. Id. at 203-04.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/1

52

Nolan and Abrams: American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years
1983]

LABOR ARBITRATION: MATURING YEARS

unions. The UAA authorizes courts to compel compliance with such agreements and to appoint arbitrators if the parties fail to do so. Other sections
detail hearing procedures and itemize arbitrators' powers. The Act also
provides for issuance of an award by the arbitrators and for confirmation,
vacation, or modification of the award by the appropriate court.
The UAA draft was endorsed by the American Arbitration Association, an
organization which promotes both commercial and labor arbitration. 0 9 The
proposal received a much frostier reception from the National Academy
of Arbitrators (NAA), a professional association of labor arbitrators. In
January 1956, the Academy voted to oppose the new act insofar as it would
apply to labor arbitration.310 The Academy's main objection was that under
the UAA courts would be granted far too much discretion in vacating arbitration awards.32 " In response to this criticism, the Commissioners amended the
draft to limit the courts' power to vacate awards. The Academy considered
31 2
the amendments insufficient, so it continued its opposition.
The impact of state arbitration laws on labor arbitration is difficult to
evaluate because of the diversity in the states' approaches. Some state arbitration statutes exclude labor arbitration agreements, 318 while most others simply
do not address issues peculiar to labor arbitration. Nevertheless, state statutes
can and do provide a supportive background. The Supreme Court in Lincoln
Mills stated that courts could look to state law for guidance in resolving
contract interpretation questions. The Court specified, however, that any
state law used would be absorbed into federal law and would not provide an
independent source of rights. 314 States statutes therefore should be applied to
labor cases only if they do not conflict with federal labor policy.31 State
arbitration laws are useful in many areas. For example, state laws may grant
309. Editorial,9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 113 (1954).
310. 9 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 216-17 (1956). Some of the perceived defects may have
been due to the failure of the Academy to express its views to the Commissioners before the
act was drafted. The Academy had directed its Committee on Law and Legislation to communicate with the Commissioners and the Commissioners invited comments from that committee but none were forthcoming. The Chairman of the committee, Russell Smith, later
explained: "The Chairman feels that he was derelict in failing to move to take advantage of
this opportunity and can offer only the plea of an overcrowded schedule." Id. at 202 n.4.
311. Id. at 211-14, 216.
312. The Academy voted at the same time to begin work on a federal law that would
apply only to labor arbitration. The Academy's Committee on Law and Legislation did
prepare a draft "United States Labor Arbitration Act," which provided only very limited
grounds for judicial review, but Congress has shown no interest in the measure. The text
of the Committee's third draft is printed at 13 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 159-68 (1960), and an
Academy policy statement on the proposed United States Labor Arbitration Act is reprinted
at 34 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 941 (1961).
313. See, e.g., 1981 Miss. Laws 1397-1405 (which applies only to construction contracts);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1982) ("notwithstanding any other provisions of law, employers and employees or their respective representatives may not agree
that ... collective bargaining disputes shall be subject to [the South Carolina version of the
UAA] and any such provisions so agreed upon shall be null and void'). See generally
Comment, The Applicability of State Arbitration Statutes to Proceedings Subject to LMRA
Section 301, 27 OHio ST. L.J. 692, 703 (1966).
314. 353 U.S. at 457.
315. See generally, Comment, supra note 313.
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arbitrators subpoena power as well as provide for orders to compel or stay
arbitration, to appoint arbitrators, or to vacate or modify arbitration awards.
Thus state laws "flesh out" the usually terse statement of arbitration rights set
forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
Federal law, notably the United States Arbitration Act (USAA),3 16 can
be used in a similar fashion. Despite early doubts about the applicability of
the USAA to collective bargaining agreements, courts since Lincoln Mills
and the Steelworkers Trilogy increasingly have looked to the USAA for
guidance.317 After Lincoln Mills no doubt remains that Congress intended
section 301 to provide for enforcement of arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. It is appropriate to apply the USAA in such cases, but
the courts have not yet agreed whether the law is to be applied in its entirety
in a section 301 action, or whether only those sections which are clearly compatible with a section 301 action should be applied. 38 The Supreme Court has
indicated the USAA should be used cautiously as a "guiding analogy" to a
19
section 301 action.3
Courts in section 301 actions are thus able to take an eclectic approach,
applying state and federal arbitration laws, either directly or by analogy, to
resolve questions left unanswered by the collective bargaining agreement.
Laws providing a supportive legal environment have measurably contributed
to the success of labor arbitration since World War II.
A Summary
Prior to World War II, the legal system, both statutory and judicial, had
been at best indifferent to labor arbitration and at worst openly hostile to it.
During the War much of that hostility eased as Congress enacted legislation
encouraging voluntary arbitration and requiring complusory arbitration in
certain cases. This pro-arbitration policy constituted a major departure from
previous policy, and once the emergency passed, it would have been easy to
resume pre-War policies.
Just the opposite happened. Congress and courts enthusiastically embraced
labor arbitration. Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, thereby establishing a
national labor policy favoring negotiated grievance systems. More importantly,
section 301 of the Act provided for court enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. The United States Arbitration Act and state arbitration
statutes provided ancillary support. Led by the Supreme Court's Lincoln
Mills and Steelworkers Trilogy decisions, the federal courts have given broad
scope to section 301. Courts have deferred their own processes pending
arbitration, have ordered reluctant parties to arbitrate, and have refused to
316. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
317. See Nolan & Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 416-17.
318. Dunau, Scope of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, N.Y.U. 24th ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 175, 181-82 (1972).
319. General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957). The
Court embraced the procedural aspects of the USAA as a "guiding analogy" to a section 301
action. Id. at 548. In a companion case, Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers
Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550 (1957), the Court indicated the analogy should not be taken too far.
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overturn arbitration awards except in extreme circumstances.3 20 The National

Labor Relations Board has also lent its support by generally deferring to
arbitral decisions.
These congressional, judicial and administrative actions have channeled

more disputes to arbitration and have made arbitration the final step in most
grievance disputes. The virtual unreviewability of the arbitrator's decision has
forced parties and arbitrators to treat the arbitration process more seriously.
Even the duty of fair representation has contributed to the strength and
acceptability of labor arbitration. The possibility that breach of the union's

duty may strip an arbitration award of its finality and the attendant risk of
liability pressure unions to arbitrate more cases and to handle them

competently. The ultimate results of these developments have been a more
competent presentation of cases to arbitrators, and a demand for more professional arbitrators.
Ill.

TOWARD A THEORY OF LABOR ARBITRATION

The second major factor shaping labor arbitration since World War II
has been the pattern of debate, criticism and response within the arbitration
community about the theory and practice of labor arbitration. These discussions have resolved some fundamental questions, laid the basis for judicial
support of arbitration, and exposed some of arbitration's shortcomings. Five
relatively distinct topics can be gleaned from these discussions and will be
examined in this section. Four of these were largely internal discussions
within the arbitration community: a debate beginning in the late 1940s on the
nature of the arbitral enterprise; a conflict in the 1950s concerning the relationship between the external legal system and labor arbitration; a related and
still unresolved argument about the use of external law by arbitrators; and a
bitter dispute in the 1960s on the quality of arbitrators. The fifth topic was a
continuing barrage of external criticism about the costs, delays, and legalism
of labor arbitration.
The Nature of the ArbitralEnterprise
Shortly after the War, two eminent figures in labor arbitration engaged
in a prolonged and prolific debate over the nature of the arbitral process.
Arguing that arbitrators are free-wheeling mediators and "agreement-makers"
was former War Labor Board Chairman George Taylor.3 21 His earliest opponent was J. Noble Braden, Tribunals Vice President of the American
820. Morris, supra note 195, at 331.
321. Taylor expressed his views in The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, I ARB.

J. (n.s.)

409 (1946); Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR
ARBrrRATION 20 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957) (an address delivered before the Second Annual
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators on January 14, 1949); and Further Remarks
on Grievance Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 92 (1949). Professor Taylor was a distinguished professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and an active arbitrator. On
Taylor's life and work, see E. SHins, W. GERSHENFELD, B. INGsTER & W. WEINBERGER, INDUSTRIAL PEACEMAKER: GEORGE W. TAYLOR'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CoLLEaCTE BARGAINING (1979)

[hereinafter E. Sims].
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Arbitration Association, who viewed arbitrators as private judges employed
22
by the parties solely to interpret the collective agreement.
Taylor's position undoubtedly was influenced by his experience as a
permanent chairman in the hosiery industry and under the General MotorsUnited Automobile Workers contract. With the consent of those parties,
Taylor freely mediated disputes and sought to educate the parties rather
than simply interpret the agreement. Taylor's "educational" tactics would
astound modern arbitrators. Such tactics included softening his opinions to
mollify General Motors, 323 submitting drafts of opinions to the parties for
discussion before disseminating them, 32 4 and assisting struggling parties in pre32
senting their cases. ,
Taylor believed that most labor agreements are merely "skeletons" of
contracts.3 2r Rarely could grievances be resolved simply by reference to the
written terms of the agreement. Thus grievance arbitration, an extension of
the collective bargaining relationship, is necessarily an exercise in "agreement
making" and not just "agreement administration." Taylor contended that
every arbitrator ought to help the parties flesh out the skeleton rather than
rule "legalistically" on the written contract and other evidence presented.
A mediated agreement is the ideal, but should the arbitrator's task require
an imposed decision, Taylor felt the arbitrator should ensure that the decision
would be acceptable to all parties.3 27 Taylor was confident that as collective
bargaining matured, cooperative relationships would replace arm's length
dealings and that permanent, impartial chairmen would replace ad hoc
umpires.
Braden could not have disagreed more. Although he conceded that Taylor's
"skeleton" idea had some validity in earlier years, Braden emphasized the
trend toward detailed contracts. Moreover, the parties themselves had been
opting for a judicial model of arbitration by inserting in their contracts strict
limitations on the arbitrator's authority. This reflected a belief that contract
terms should be interpreted by the arbitrator, not made or modified by him.
For Braden an arbitrator should behave as a judge, not "a sort of labor relations
psychiatrist." 328 Braden believed that legal standards and principles should
322. Braden wrote numerous articles on the subject, see, e.g., Problems in Labor Arbitration, 13 Mo. L. REv. 143 (1948); Arbitration and Arbitration Provisions, N.Y.U. 2ND ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 355 (1949); Current Problems in Labor-Management Arbitration, 6 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 91 (1951).
323. G. Heliker, supra note 73, at 104-05. Such things were not at all uncommon in the
early days of arbitration. Harry Shulman, who held the post of umpire at Ford Motor Co.,
held hundreds of cases for years rather than issue controversial decisions. NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRAToRs, supra note 84; interview with Harry H. Platt, at 7; interview with Ralph
Seward, at 24. Taylor's arbitration practice is described in Gershenfeld, Early Years: Grievance Arbitration, in E. SHIts, supra note 321, at 29.
324. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 84, interview with Ralph Seward,
at 21.
325. Id. at 5.
326. This was oftentimes true in the early days of arbitration. Id. at 10-Il.
327. William Simkin, a colleague of Taylor's, emphasized this point in his monograph
ACCEPTABILITY AS A FAcTOR IN ARBITRATION UNDER AN EXISTING AGREEMENT (1952).
328. Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitration,supra note 322, at 147. Cf. Fuller, Collective
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apply to grievance disputes, thus making arbitration clearly distinguishable
from collective bargaining. While Taylor found legal intervention in arbitration offensive, Braden welcomed it to enforce "good arbitration practice and
procedure."32 9 Braden supported ad hoc arbitration, as opposed to permanent
chairman relationships, as the best way to foster the judicial model. Braden
admitted that Taylor's "impartial chairman" approach worked in some
330
cases, but he insisted that "to call it arbitration is a misnomer."
In the end, the Braden approach triumphed. Several arbitrators of Taylor's
school of thought nonetheless continue to use mediation in arbitration, 33 but
most arbitrators have adopted the quasi-judicial model, applying established
rules and evaluating evidence to resolve collective bargaining disputes.3I2
Parties to collective agreements have made the same choice by placing contractual limitations on the arbitrator's authority and by selecting ad hoc
arbitration as opposed to impartial chairmen.3 s3

Bargainingand the Arbitrator,1963 Wis. L. Rav. 3, 4 (referring to the non-judicial arbitrator
as a "labor relations physician').
329. Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitration, supra note 322, at 146.
330. Braden, Arbitration and Arbitration Provisions,supra note 322, at 359. Both Taylor
and Braden exercised great influence on arbitrators. Taylor did so mainly by training other
arbitrators. Braden used his position as Tribunals Vice President of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) to insist that arbitrators follow the judicial model. G. Allen Dash, Jr. recently recounted how in the mid-forties he tried to bring about a settlement in an AAA
case. At the time an AAA representative told him "You shouldn't do this. This is not the
way we approach it in AAA." Later he received a call from the AAA informing him this
was the AAA philosophy of arbitration, and that "it was hoped I would not follow such
an approach as a usual thing." NATIONAL ACADEMY or ARBITRATORS, supra note 84, interview with G. Allan Dash, Jr., at 38.
The Taylor/Braden debate was not an entirely novel one. William Leiserson vigorously
supported the judicial model in the 1920s, while the early clothing industry arbitrators
distinctly favored the mediator model. See Nolan & Abrams, Early Years, supra note 2, at 39595. The debate struck sensitive nerves in the early postwar years, though, because labor arbitration was at a crossroads. Conferences of arbitrators were held around the country to discuss
this fundamental question while others offered their opinions in print. Eastman, Labor
ArbitratorsConference, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 125 (1949). Many of the articles written in this debate
are cited in Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process:A Report with Comments, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1115, 1147-48 n.38 (1964).
331. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY or ARBITRAToRs, supra note 84, interview with William
E. Simkin, at 26-27 (citing himself, Sam Kagel, Allan Dash and others). A few still denigrate
the idea that there is a "common law" of the collective bargaining agreement which should
guide the exercise of arbitral discretion. See, e.g., Seitz, The Citation of Authority and Precedent in Arbitration (Its Use and Abuse), 38 ARB. J. (n.s.) Dec. 1983, at 58.
332. See Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making in
Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C.D.L. REv. 551, 564-72 (1981); Fuller Collective Bargaining and the
Arbitrator,1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 23-24 ("The morality of arbitration lies in a decision according to the law of the contract.'); Prasow & Peters, The Development of Judicial Arbitration
in Labor-Management Disputes, 9 CAL. MGrr. REv. 7 (1967); Weiler, The Role of the
Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions, 19 U. ToRourro L.J. 16 (1969).
333. One recent study found that only 12% of collective bargaining agreements specifying
the means of selecting an arbitrator provide for a permanent arbitrator, arbitration board
or panel of arbitrators, while 68% provided for ad hoc arbitrators. Seventy-nine percent
of the agreements studied placed restrictions on arbitrators. Basic Patterns in Grievance and
Arbitration Provisions, 96 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-1 (5-17-83).
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The RelationshipBetween Arbitration
and the ExternalLegal System
The second debate within the arbitration community was over the relationship between the external legal system and labor arbitration, in particular the use of courts to enforce arbitration agreements and review arbitration awards. The strongest statement opposing the legal system's intervention
in the labor arbitration process was made in 1955 by Harry Shulman, Dean
of Yale Law School.3 3 4 Shulman described the "autonomous rule of law"

created by labor and management in collective bargaining and the arbitrators'
335
In
roles in that system, and urged that arbitration be left alone by the law.
workings
the
complex
to
understand
effect, Shulman doubted judges' ability
of industrial self-government, and felt that unskilled judicial intrusion might
injure the system rather than aid it.
Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard was less pessimistic about judicial
activity.336 He was just as conscious as Shulman of arbitration's role in the
system of industrial self-government, and recognized the harm that clumsy
judicial intervention could cause. Unlike Shulman, however, he believed the
legal system could strengthen arbitration "by putting the force of law behind
the arbitration clause and the ultimate award."3 3 7 Cox felt that labor lawyers
should teach the courts to understand labor relations principles so they could
bolster arbitration rather than hinder it. s38
The Steelworkers Trilogy ended this dispute for all practical purposes by
limiting judicial intervention into the substance of arbitration decisions while
334. Shulman's Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School dealt with
more than this point, but it is best remembered for his brief comments on the issue.
335. The arbitration is an integral part of the system of self-government. And the
system is designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice for the employees.
It is a means of making collective bargaining work and thus preserving private enterprise in a free government. When it works fairly well, it does not need the sanction
of the law of contracts or the law of arbitration. It is only when the system breaks
down completely that the courts' aid in these respects is invoked. But the courts
cannot, by occasional sporadic decision, restore the parties' continuing relationship;
and their intervention in such cases may seriously affect the going systems of selfgovernment. When their autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties
better be left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather than to
court actions on the contract or on the arbitration award? I suggest that the law
stay out -but, mind you, not the lawyers.
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955).
See also id. at 1001-02.
336. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAuv. L. REv. 601 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as Cox, Rights]; Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAaV. L. REV. 1482 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Cox, Reflections].
337. Cox, Reflections, supra note 336, at 1487; see also Cox, Rights, supra note 336, at
604-05.
338. The scholar's object was to devise "a coherent description not merely of the
trappings of arbitration but of its inner logic in terms related to the construction of other
legal instruments" -and to use this understanding to "pave the way to a wiser definition of
" Cox, Reflections, supra note 336, at
the proper roles of the court and the arbitration ..
1489. See also Cox, Rights, supra note 36, at 604-05.
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placing the full support of the federal judiciary behind the arbitration process.
In the Trilogy, the Court cited Shulman on the autonomous nature of the

collective bargaining process, and used Shulman's authority to buttress holdings which he would have abhorred had he lived to see them.33 9 The Court also
cited Cox's writings, perhaps claiming more support from them than they
really offered. 34 0 Yet, insofar as the Shulman/Cox debate was concerned, the
Court emerged a firm proponent of the theories espoused by Cox.
The Use of External Law by Arbitrators
The third of the internal debates over the nature of labor arbitration began
in 1967 when Professor Bernard Meltzer of the University of Chicago and
Robert Howlett, then Chairman of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board,
spoke at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Both men addressed the question of whether arbitrators should attempt to
apply external law in arbitration proceedings.
The scope of the question is actually narrower than may first appear.
Virtually all students of arbitration agree that an arbitrator could use statutory
law as an interpretive aid, and could deal with legal issues when both parties
dearly authorize him to do so. The dispute begins when one party requests
that an arbitrator apply external law rather than the terms of the collective
agreement. 4 1
Professor Meltzer argued that arbitrators in such situations "should respect the agreement and ignore the law."3 42 He believed that arbitrators
generally lack both the competence and the consent of the parties to apply
external law. As to their competence, Meltzer pointed out that many arbitrators have no legal training and those that do are not necessarily knowledgeable
about all the relevant legal authorities. As to the parties' consent, Meltzer
claimed that the arbitrator is asked "to construe and not to destroy their
agreement." A decision based on the arbitrator's view of statutory authority
3 43
would thus exceed the scope of his power.
Meltzer recognized that his approach might result in an award requiring

an illegal act or one leading to a second and overlapping judicial proceeding,
but he was not deterred. The arbitrator, he thought, is "the proctor of the
agreement and not of the statutes."3 44 Accordingly, the contract and the law
should be viewed as entirely separate and the arbitrator should not apply
them together unless the parties expressly ask him to do so.M
339. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warriors & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 580, 581

(1960).
340. Id. at 579, 583.
341. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, 23 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ARB.
29, 30 (1970).
342. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology Law and Labor Arbitration, 20 PRoc.
NAT'L AcAD. ARB. 1, 16 (1967).
343. Id. at 16-17. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
US. 593, 597 (1960).
344. Meltzer, supra note 342, at 18-19.
345. Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinders, 21 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. ARB.
58, 60-63 (1968) [hereinafter Meltzer, Rejoinders]; Meltzer, supra note 342, at 16 n.37.
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Howlett disagreed totally. He felt that arbitrators should consider fully
all legal questions affecting the grievance, even those which the parties have
not clearly presented to him. 3 6 Addressing the argument that parties only
authorize an arbitrator to interpret the contract, Howlett asserted that "[a]ll
contracts are subject to statute and common law; and each contract includes
all applicable law." Even a clause prohibiting the arbitrator from modifying
the contract should not prevent him from applying positive law because "all
3
contracts are made within, not outside the law." 47
Howlett had little patience for the argument that non-lawyer arbitrators
lacked the competence to interpret legal provisions. The law does not require
members of the National Labor Relations Board to be lawyers, lie responded,
and the Board's non-lawyer members have not hesitated to participate in decisions on legal questions . 4 Howlett later argued that non-lawyer arbitrators
may actually be more knowledgeable about labor law than are circuit court
judges. Arbitrators who are lawyers are not only competent, they have a duty
as officers of the court to "administer the law."'' 9 Moreover, Howlett suggested
that if the arbitrator ignored the law, his award might result in error and
eventually force the grievant into a second legal proceeding. Thus it would be
more efficient for the arbitrator to render a decision based on both contract
language and the law in a single proceeding. 350
In the wealth of discussion following the opening guns of the debate,
virtually no one seconded Howlett. One of the few who did was Professor
Charles Morris. Morris argued that it was simply too late "to turn the clock
back to the collective agreement of an earlier day," because it is "an inescapable fact that the agreement is no longer the exclusive province of the
immediate parties." External law shapes the contours of the agreement and
specifies the role arbitration is to play in the national labor policy. Arbitrators
may ignore that external law, but to the extent that they do, "arbitration will
surely lose its relevance." 351 He agreed with Howlett that many arbitrators
had developed or could develop the necessary competence to deal with statutory
questions, or would decline cases they could not handle. While he anticipated
some hard problems, he felt that the courts might even extend the Enterprise
Wheel decision to limit judicial review of an arbitrator's application of statutory law, at least in areas where the courts had primary jurisdiction.352
Curiously, the next closest position to Howlett's was first introduced in a
devastating attack on Howlett's premises. In a 1968 address to the National
346. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, 20 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 67,
83-93 (1967).
347. Id. at 83, 88. Howlett later elaborated on the issue of the arbitrator's authority to
interpret the law. He rejected any distinction between "public" and "private" rights in
the collective bargaining area because public policy made collective bargaining agreements
enforceable and because arbitrators have been authorized and requested by the NLRB and
the courts to decide questions of statutory interpretation. Howlett, A Reprise, 21 PROc. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 64, 66-67 (1968).
348. Howlett, supra note 346, at 105.
349. Howlett, supra note 347, at 68.
350. Id. at 83.
351. Morris, Comment, 24 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 65, 71-72 (1971).
352. Id. at 74-75.
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Academy of Arbitrators, Richard Mittenthal flatly rejected Howlett's claim
that all laws are automatically incorporated in all contracts. 3 53 That theory rests
on the "fictions" that everyone knows the law and makes his contracts with
reference to it. Mittenthal also observed that the incorporation theory is rejected as untenable by the most eminent authorities in contract law. 354 Arbitrators derive their authority from the contract, not from external law. Neither
the NLR.B nor the courts can give an arbitrator authority beyond that
which the parties confer on him. The Board and the courts generally defer
to arbitrators' decisions regarding contract questions. Such deference could
not be expected to continue if arbitrators ruled on questions of law. 355
In a few cases, however, Mittenthal would allow the arbitrator to follow
the law rather than the contract. He emphasized that some arbitrators do
possess the ability to interpret the law as well as the contract, and parties can
choose a legally competent arbitrator if they know the grievance will involve
a legal question. If a contract seems to require unlawful conduct the arbitrator should decline to order such conduct. The frequent use of "separability"
or "savings" clauses indicate the parties did not intend the arbitrator to require
illegal conduct.355 Clauses providing that the arbitrator's award will be "final
and binding" should also warn the arbitrator against ordering illegalities: if
he does so, he invites noncompliance and judicial intervention, which would
frustrate the parties' desire that the award be final. Mittenthal concluded that
"although the arbitrator's award may permit conduct forbidden by law but
sanctioned by contract, it should not require conduct forbidden by law even
35 7
though sanctioned by contract."
Mittenthal's distinction between awards permitting and those requiring
illegal conduct is inherently appealing, but it contains new problems.3 58 If
one rejects Howlett's automatic incorporation theory, then the arbitrator
should follow the contract rather than the law regardless of whether he is
asked to require or merely tolerate illegal conduct. For example, consider the
case of a seniority provision which violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.859 If an employer follows the contract and lays off black employees,
they may bring a grievance demanding compliance with the law rather than
353.

Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration,21 PRoC. NAT'L AcAD.An. 42 (1968).

354. Id. at 44-45.
355. According to Mittenthal, Howlett's position is supported neither by statute, nor
by the common law of contracts, nor by national labor policy. Id. at 45-46, 52-54.

356. Mittenthal's point was recently supported by a Ninth Circuit decision which held
a "General Savings Clause" indicated that the parties intended to give the arbitrator authority
to look to external law for guidance. Day Constr. Co. v. Carpenters Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471,
(9th Cir. 1984). The court stated that it would defer to the arbitrator's award even if he misinterpreted the law, so long as there is no "manifest disregard of the law" and the award
does not violate the law or any well-defined public policy. Id. at 2463.
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 Micii. L. REv. 1137, 1142 (1977);
357. Mittenthal, supranote 353, at 48-50.
358. See, e.g., Meltzer, Rejoinders, supra note 345, at 59-60; St. Antoine, 21 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Am. 75, 77-79 (1968); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A

Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1137, 1142 (1977);
Sovern, supra note 341, at 33.
359. 42 US.C. § 2000e (1976).
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the contract. If the employer follows the law and lays off white employees,
they may bring a grievance demanding compliance with the contract rather
than the law. Mittenthal would have the arbitrator deny the grievances in both
cases. Under this approach, though, "the role accorded to law would depend
on how an employer resolved a controversy and not on its essential character
or the function properly delegated to different adjudicative agencies ...
[S]uch an approach transforms an accidental consideration into a decisive
one." 360
Other scholars more nearly agreed with Meltzer. 361 In the most sophisticated
treatment of the question, Professor David Feller argued that even though
the parties may authorize the arbitrator to decide legal questions, arbitration
suffers if they do so. Feller's main concern was for arbitration's institutional
competence rather than arbitrators' individual ability. Courts defer to arbitrators on contract questions because they believe arbitration is not merely a
substitute for judicial interpretation but is rather "the capstone of an entirely
different process of industrial self-government."3 62 Deference to the arbitration
process will be impossible to maintain if arbitrators step out of that role and
seek to interpret or apply statutes. Arbitral autonomy can therefore be preserved only if arbitrators abj ure any authority to decide disputed questions of
external law.36 The abstentionist position is difficult to maintain in extreme
cases, however, and even Feller would make an exception when it is clear
and undisputed that a challenged employer action was required by external
law.

64

While the weight of scholarly authority is on Meltzer's end of the spectrum,
even those nearest to him recognize that arbitrators cannot simply ignore external law in all cases. Cases involving claims of employment discrimination
360. Meltzer, Rejoinders, supra note 345, at 60; Sovern, supra note 341, at 33. The only
other prominent writer willing to grant the arbitrator any authority to favor the law over the
contract was Michael Sovern. Sovern felt that some arbitrators were sufficiently competent
to decide legal issues and that it is not unequivocally clear that parties intend to prohibit
arbitrators from applying positive law. Sovern believed that a competent arbitrator would act
within his authority by ruling on a contention that the law immunizes or requires conduct
violating the contract, but only when the courts lack primary jurisdiction over the question of
law. Sovern, supra note 341, at 38-45.
361. Theodore St. Antoine of the University of Michigan insisted that an arbitrator
could decide legal issues only when authorized to do so by the parties. Unlike Meltzer, St.
Antoine recognized that authority can be either express or implied; a contract clause which
"plainly tracks certain statutory language," for example, suggests that "the parties intended
their agreement to be construed in accordance with the statute." St. Antoine, supra note 358,
at 1143.
362. Feller, Arbitration: The Days of Its Glory are Numbered, 2 INDus. REL. L.J. 97, 110
(1977); cf. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI.L. REv.30, 34 (1972).
363. "[U]nless unmistakably directed otherwise by the parties, arbitrators best serve the
interests of the parties, and of the process as a whole, if they make it crystal clear that they
are interpreting the agreement, not the external law, even where the agreement provisions
parallel those of the external law." The Impact of External Law Upon Arbitration, in THE
FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 111

(J.

Correge, V. Hughes, & M. Stone, eds.,

1976).
364. Id.atill.
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have proven especially troublesome, and generally constitute the bulk of cases
where an arbitrator is asked to apply positive law.
Parties and arbitrators alike were given an incentive to design special
arbitration procedures for employment discrimination cases by the Supreme
Court in 1974. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,8 5 the Court held that an

employee had a statutory right to a trial de novo in federal court under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even if his claim had previously been
submitted to arbitration. The Court's holding denied to arbitration awards
in discrimination cases the conclusive effect the NLRB gives to awards
where contract interpretation questions are relevant to statutory issues. Awards
in employment discrimination cases are also denied the deference the Court
itself gives to arbitration of nondiscrimination issues. The Court stated that
because arbitration's purposes, sources of authority and procedures differed
from those established by Tide VII, an arbitration award should not foreclose access to the courts.
The Court did direct district courts to consider the award and give it appropriate weight, using such factors as the existence of contract provisions
conforming to Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitration,
the adequacy of the record on the discrimination issue, and the special
competence of the arbitrator. 366 It seemed as if the Court was openly inviting
parties to construct arbitration arrangements so that the judiciary would give
substantial weight to the resulting awards.
Few arbitrators were equipped to meet the higher standards suggested by
the Supreme Court. A survey of the most experienced arbitrators showed that
barely one out of two regularly read advance sheets to keep abreast of Title
VII developments, and only one out of seven professed ability to define accurately basic terms of discrimination law.3 67 These limitations did not keep
parties from selecting these arbitrators for discrimination cases, nor did it
discourage arbitrators from accepting the assignments. Fully half of those
who stated they did not feel professionally competent to decide legal issues
of this sort had in fact decided such cases in the preceding year.368
The Alexander Court's invitation was eagerly accepted, at least in print.
Most proposals involved a greater degree of formality, including use of a
transcript, a right of individual counsel for the grievant and a requirement
of written findings of fact and conclusions of law.36 9 Although greater formality
was inevitable if arbitrations were to meet the Alexander standards, that very
365. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
366. Id. at 60.
367. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study,
28 PRoc. NAT'L Ac z. ARB. 59, 71-72 (1975). The evidence seemed to bear out Justice Story's
dictum that arbitrators are "not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of
law or equity, to administer either effectually, in complicated cases; and hence it has been

said that the judgment of arbitrators is but rusticum judicium." Tobey v. County of Bristol,
23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).

368. Edwards, supra note 367, at 73-74.
369. E.g., Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for
Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAB. L.J. 265, 274-75 (1976); Newman, Post-Gardner.
Denver Developments in the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 28 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB.

36, 37-38 (1975).
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formality carried a steep price. The resulting arbitration procedure might be
more valuable for dealing with discrimination cases, but it might be less valuable as arbitration - less simple, less speedy, and less economical. 0°
A more modest proposal placed less weight on meeting all of the Alexander
standards and more on preserving the essence of traditional arbitration: it
simply asked the arbitrator to address each of the Alexander standards in his
opinion.3 71 If the arbitrator would specify the provisions of the contract relied
upon, describe the procedural aspects of the arbitration, comment on the
evidence submitted, and spell out more clearly the facts and conclusions of
law, he would "set the stage for a court proceeding where the weight to be
given to his or her opinion can be properly assessed." This type of procedure
would fulfill the intent of the Supreme Court and protect individual rights,
372
while preserving important values of the arbitral process.

The critics of the mingling of contract and law remained unconvinced. Professor Meltzer, for instance, insisted that arbitrators "lack the institutional
credentials that give moral authority to the decisions of the federal judiciary"
and feared that arbitration itself would not work well when the supporting
factors present in purely contractual disputes were removed. 37 3
Despite the divisions among the scholarly disputants, there is today widespread acceptance of some fundamental points. First, it is now well established
that an arbitrator is not obliged to consider legal questions raised by one
party if the contract is silent on those issues.37 4 Second, arbitrators almost
unanimously deplore the impact of external law on arbitration, some even
predicting that it will bring to an end arbitration's "Golden Age."3 75 Meltzer's
concerns about arbitrators' lack of competence and consent to decide legal
questions are widely shared, if not consistently put into practice. Finally, and
despite the first two points of agreement, most arbitrators stand ready to
favor external law over the contract when the employer can show that the
challenged action was required by

76

law.3

While this consensus follows Richard

370. As the Supreme Court suggested in Alexander, the very things that make arbitration
desirable as a private dispute-resolution system make it unsuitable as an instrument for

implementing public policy. 415 U.S. at 57-58.
371. Williams, A Modest Proposal for the Immediate Future, 29 PROc. NAT'L
Aim. 34,44-45 (1976).
372.
373.

AcAD.

Id. at 45.
Meltzer, The Parties' Process and the Public's Purposes, 29 Paoc. NAT'L ACAD. 46,

52-53 (1976).
374. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 103 S.Ct. 2177 (1983), the
Supreme Court upheld the enforcement of an award based solely on the collective bargaining
agreement, even though the employer had strenuously argued that the challenged action
was required by a conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The arbitrator held that he had no authority to consider extra-contractual authorities,
and the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court could not "second-guess" an arbitrator's
interpretation of what authority the contract gave him. Id. at 2644.
375. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB.
97 (1976). But see Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The "Common Law of the
Shop" v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. (n.s.) 65 (1977). Edwards argues that the negative impact
of external law is not so great as Feller suggests, and that it is possible for arbitration to
expand to deal with issues of public law.
876. Meltzer, supra note 373, at 57-58.
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Mittenthal's suggestion, given the theoretical problems with his approach,
it is unlikely that this consensus developed by force of logic. It would be
more plausible to treat this result as a product of circumstance: arbitrators
might prefer to follow the contract rather than the law, but they simply
cannot bring themselves to order a party to violate the law. At that point,
arbitrators reject the abstentionist theory along with consistency. Perhaps by
doing so, however, they more nearly reflect the true intentions of the parties
to the collective agreement.
The Quality of Arbitrators
The last of the internal debates occurred in the mid-to-late 1960s. The

debate was initiated by a distinguished former arbitrator, Judge Paul Hays
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In his 1964
Storrs lectures at Yale Law School, Hays blasted the arbitration system, con-

centrating his criticism on the quality of arbitrators. 377 Much of Hays' speech
was well within the realm of permissible academic debate on arbitration. He
criticized arbitration's costs and delays37s and agreed with Shulman that the
9
The
legal system should not enforce arbitration agreements or awardsY.3
controversy arose from Hays' attacks on the competence and ethics of labor
arbitrators. Hays argued that most arbitrators had none of the special expertise the Supreme Court believed them to have.380 Hays also asserted that
many, if not most, arbitrators were unethical. They issued compromise awards
to perpetuate themselves in office and rigged awards to disguise an unpopular
agreement between labor and management. 388 In sum, Hays viewed labor
377. The lectures were published two years later as LABoR ARBrRATION: A DmSSNTING
ViEw. The force of his charges was increased by the fact that he had been a member of
the club, so to speak. Perhaps their effect was even greater because arbitrators had basked in
the praise given them by Justice Douglas in the Trilogy. E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 863 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance"
as a labor arbitrator).
378. P. HAys, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING ViEw 66 (1966).
379. Id. at 114-15.
380. The most that Hays would admit was that arbitrators varied widely in quality, yet
even the least of them was given almost unreviewable authority by the courts. At the worst,
many are incompetent. Id. at 52-59, 111-12.
281. Id. at 59-62, 93-94 (compromise awards); id. at 62-66 (rigged awards).
Hays' strongest language, however, came at the end of his lectures:
There are only a handful of arbitrators who, like Shulman and Cox, have the
knowledge, training, skill, and character to make them good judges and therefore
good arbitrators. In literally thousands of cases every year, decisions are made by
arbitrators who are wholly unfitted for their jobs - who do not have the requisite
knowledge, training, skill, intelligence, and character.
A proportion of arbitration awards, no one knows how large a proportion, are
decided not on the basis of the evidence or of the contract or other proper considerations, but in a way which in the arbitrator's opinion makes it likely that he will
be hired for other arbitration cases....
Another proportion of awards is rigged awards, rendered by arbitrators who are
the creatures of those who hire them for the purpose of misleading others, usually
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arbitration as "a usually undesirable and frequently intolerable procedure."' 2
To put it mildly, Hays' assertions were not well received in the arbitration
community. Reactions were uniformly negative and frequently bitter. 383 Not
surprisingly, one reaction was to challenge the accuracy of Hays' charges.
Saul Wallen, a former president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, took
Hays to task, 384 arguing that labor arbitration is in fact a distinct specialty,
well mastered by experienced arbitrators. He emphasized that many arbitrators
serve the same parties repeatedly. Even when the parties are new to the
arbitrator, "his background enables him to quickly grasp and comprehend
what often would be obscure to someone not previously exposed."385 Arbitrators' abilities are demonstrated by "a test no judge is ever called upon to meet
- the test of the market place - the judgment of those in a position freely to
38 6
contract for their services."
Wallen also rejected Hays' allegation that many arbitration awards are
calculated to encourage use of the arbitrator in future cases, describing the
charge as "arrant nonsense." Wallen reasoned that "the surest way for an
arbitrator not to be hired for other arbitration cases by at least one of the
same parties is to render a decision without regard to the evidence of the
contract." Wallen further argued that if an arbitrator compromises an award
to avoid offending either party, "his cowardice becomes immediately apparent
to both, and he courts the likelihood that both will axe him." 3817 More
generally, Wallen felt it unjust to categorize arbitrators as venal and craven: "It
may surprise Judge Hays to learn that there are some men in this world who
think that to meet the challenge to act honorably and decide fairly is more
important than the possible loss of future income and that not all such men
388
are judges."
the union membership, about the conduct of their representatives .... We know that
a large proportion of the awards of arbitrators are rendered by incompetents, that another proportion - we do not know how large but are permitted by the circumstances to
suspect that it is quite large- is rendered on the basis of what award might be best
for the arbitrator's future. We know there is another group of cases ... in which the

arbitrator has rendered a rigged award.
Id. at 112-13.
382. Id. at 114.
383. Participants in the Hays debate used book reviews as a common medium. See, Aaron,
Book Review, 42 WASH. L. REv. 976 (1967). Aaron referred to the main chapter discussed

here as "an ill-tempered, rather gossipy tirade, replete with unwarranted references and
unfair accusations supported by inferences from relatively few sources and by quotations
frequently cited out of context." Id. at 977. See also Meltzer, Book Review, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.

211 (1966); Shieber, Book Review, 41 TUL. L. REV. 743 (1967). For a good review of the
controversy stirred up by Hays' lectures, see Getman, The Debate Over the Caliber of
Arbitrators:Judge Hays and His Critics, 44 IND. L.J. (1969).
384. Wallen, Arbitrators and Judges-Dispelling the Hays Haze, 9 CAL. MGMT. REv. 17
(1967). See also Wallen, Book Review, 81 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1967).
385. Wallen, Arbitrators and Judges, supra note 384, at 20. In this respect arbitrators
have an advantage over judges. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis.
L. REv. 3,11-12.

386. Wallen, Arbitratorsand Judges,supra note 384, at 21.
387. Wallen, Book Review, supra note 384, at 511.
388. Wallen, Arbitratorsand Judges, supra note 384, at 22.
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A second reaction by the arbitration community to Hays' criticism was
more constructive. More attention began to be paid to arbitrators' shortcomings and even the National Academy of Arbitrators sought ways to remedy
them.389 Arbitration agencies screened panel applicants more carefully, and
there were even suggestions that arbitrators should be certified by some
authority.. 0
The Hays controversy had faded by the 1970s. In part, this demise was
due to the lack of evidence offered by Hays and the lack of public support
his criticisms received. In addition, parties to collective bargaining agreements
apparently were not alarmed by Hays' claims. The percentage of agreements
containing arbitration clauses continued to grow, and eventually exceeded
ninety-five percent. Moreover, new pragmatic criticisms of arbitration were
arising outside the arbitration community, attacking the efficiency of the
arbitration process itself.
The Efficiency of the Labor ArbitrationProcess
While arbitrators were engaging in these internal disputes, a steady stream
of complaints flowed from outside the profession centering on the costs,
delays, and "legalism" of labor arbitration. Indeed, such complaints have
been common throughout the postwar era.39' Yet this criticism has been
accompanied by wider acceptance of arbitration in practice. 92 For all its faults,
arbitration must be preferable to available alternatives.
Critics point out that arbitration gained initial favor because it was faster,
cheaper and less formal than litigation. They then note that arbitration
has increasingly become a slower, more expensive and more formal process.
This concern could be substantiated simply by observing that in 1981 the

389. M. DERBER, THE AMFmac IDEA OF INDusrnWAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965, at 504 (1970).
390. Two-thirds of the lawyer respondents to a 1977 poll of the ABA's Section on Labor
Relations Law thought that the ABA itself should certify arbitrators and an even higher
percentage felt that arbitrators should be required to pass an examination. See Coulson,
Certification and Training of Labor Arbitrators: Should Arbitrators Be Certified? Dead
Horse Rides Again, 30 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 173, 175-76 (1977).
391. Such complaints have been common throughout the postwar era. The literature on
this subject is vast. A sampling of the last few decades includes: Aaron, Labor Arbitration
and Its Critics, 10 LAB. LJ. 605 (1959); Bartlett, Labor Arbitration: The Problem of Legalism,
62 OR. L. REv. 195 (1983); Davey, What's Right and What's Wrong with Grievance Arbitration: The PractitionersAir Their Views, 28 ARB. J. (n.s.) 209 (1973); Iserman, The Arbitrator
in Grievance Procedures: Is Arbitration the Way to Settle Labor Disputes?, 35 A.B.A. J. 987
(1949): Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration
Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MIcm. L. REv. 1115 (1964); Newman & Wilson,
Promise and Performance of Arbitration from Union Point of View, DAMY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 106, at D-1 (June 1, 1983); Raffaele, Needed: A Fourth Party in Industrial
Relations, 13 LAn. LJ. 230 (1962); Seitz, Delay: The Asp in the Bosom of Arbitration, 36
AmB. J. (ns.) 29 (1981); Straus, Labor Arbitrationand Its Critics, 20 Aim. J. (n.s.) 197 (1965);
Veglahn, Arbitration Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB. L.J. 49 (1979).
392. As Robben Fleming put it some years ago, "[t]wo clearly identifiable trends in
labor arbitration are discernible in the postwar years. One is the increasing use and popularity
of the process, and the other, interestingly enough, is the increasing criticism of it." Fleming,
The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963, 52 Ky L.J. 817, 817 (1964).
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average grievance took 247 days from inception to issuance of the arbitration
award, with average arbitrator's charges for fees and expenses of $1,132.31. 311
One response to these criticisms is that external factors have contributed to
the costs and delays of arbitration. For example, the only part of the cost
problem exclusively within the arbitrator's control, his own fee, has not increased by an inordinate amount. Available statistics suggest that arbitrators'
fees have not increased any faster than manufacturing earnings3 94 Similarly,
although the average length of time from grievance to award has lengthened
since World War II, most of this increase has been at the pre-hearing stage,
over which arbitrators have relatively little control. More recently, the posthearing time required has dropped more than a quarter. 395 Moreover, much
of the time delay after hearing is due to the increased use of transcripts and
briefs by the parties themselves.3 9
The parties thus exercise a great deal of influence over both costs and
time. If they choose to use lawyers, have a transcript taken, and file briefs,
both time and costs will inevitably increase. In fact, virtually every commentator on these issues has recommended that labor and management follow
397
simplified procedures to reduce delays and expenses.
The charge of "legalism" is closely related to the problems of delay and
expense. Surely, arbitration is more formal today than previously, but formality
follows when the parties themselves elect to hire an attorney, have a written
transcript recorded and submit posthearing briefs. External forces, such as the
NLRB's and the courts' deference to arbitration awards, the duty of fair
representation, and employment discrimination legislation, also influence
the arbitrator and the parties to conduct more formalistic proceedings. 98 Additionally, the deliberate movement of labor and management away from
Taylor's free-wheeling mediator model of an arbitrator to the judicial model
urged by J. Noble Braden has increased the level of formality.
IV.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

The Professionalizationof Labor Arbitrators
At the beginning of World War II there were relatively few experienced
393.

Newman & Wilson, supra note 391, at D-2 (citing FMCS statistics for Fiscal Year

1981).
394. One study of earlier complaints found that fees "do not appear to have increased
disproportionately to such standards as average hourly wages in manufacturing." R. FLEMING,
THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 54 (1965). Per diem fees climbed from $130.55 to $299.62
(130%) and total fees from $378.61 to $988.76 (161%) from 1965 through 1981. Compare
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 19th Annual Report 43 (1966) with 34th Annual
Report 37 (1981). During that same period, the average annual wage in manufacturing rose
199%, from $6,566 to $19,647. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 400 (1982-83).
395.

FMCS, 34th Annual Report 39 (1981)

(prehearing time increased from 195.1 in

1972 days to 196.7; post-hearing phase dropped from 46.4 days to 33.56 days).
396. One study covering the 30 years between 1942 and 1972 concluded that in nonbriefed cases arbitrators were taking no more time to decide cases at the end of that period
than they were at the start. Davis & Pati, Elapsed Time Patterns in Labor Grievance Arbitration: 1942-1972, 29 ARB. J. (n.s.) 15 (1974).
397. See R. FLEMING, supra note 394, at 53-55, 76-77; Davis & Pati, supra note 396, at 26-27;
Newman & Wilson, supra note 393, at D-2 to D-6; Veglahn, supra note 391.
398. Bartlett, supra note 391, at 210-25.
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labor arbitrators, and very few of these arbitrated on a professional, full-time
basis. By the War's end, more arbitrators had gained experience and were
beginning to devote their professional energies to arbitration. Because of
their mutual interests, a pre-professional culture of arbitrators began to develop: a coterie of people distinguished by work in peculiar endeavors which
required specialized skills. Within twenty years, labor arbitrators organized a
professional association, adopted an ethical code, fostered programs of training and apprenticeships for novices, adopted positions on legislation affecting
their interests, and in many other ways acted as a profession rather than as an
informal group.
The first major step toward this professional development was undertaken
for purposes unrelated to promoting arbitration. In 1946 the Bureau of
National Affairs (BNA) published the first volume of its Labor Arbitration
Reports. Intended as a successor to the War Labor Reports, the series' stated
purpose was simply to "collect and classify awards handed down by arbitrators,"3 09 for practitioners' benefit. The unintended effect was the fostering of
arbitral professionalization by designating arbitration as a separate field of
labor relations and by making it possible to identify the leading persons in the
field. The reports also provided the raw material out of which a common law
of labor agreements could be fashioned.
The next step was a deliberate one toward promoting professionalization.
In 1947, a small group of arbitrators, most of them alumni of the War Labor
Board (WLB), spearheaded the organization of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. 40 0 There were several motivations behind the formation of the
Academy. Some arbitrators were dissatisfied with certain policies of the
American Arbitration Association, 401 while others were concerned about the
increasing criticism of arbitration as a process. Most felt that arbitration could
be preserved "only if it were kept in professional hands and away from the
amateurs and the shysters." 40 2 The Academy's founders realized that decisional
standards were required to assure that arbitrators were not ruling on the
basis of their personal preferences.
Although some of the early members viewed the group as a way of continuing WLB friendships, chief promoter Alfred Colby stressed the concept of
a learned society.403 Colby's learned society faction was dominant, as the
Academy's constitutional provisions make clear. 4°4 One of the Academy's
399. 1 Lab. Arb. (BNA) ii (1946).
400. Following an informal gathering in Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1947, the
Academy was officially created at a meeting in Chicago in September of that year. This description is pieced together from the recollections of some of the early members. Not all
of the recollections are consistent. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRAToRs, supra note 84, interview with G. Allan Dash, Jr., at 56-58, 66; interview with John Day Larkin, at 5-6; interview
with Ralph T. Seward, at 5, 86-88; interview with William E. Simkin, at 40-41; McDermott,
Some Developments in the History of the National Academy of Arbitrators, 25 PRoc. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 27 (1972).
401. E. W=rr, supra note 4, at 52-53.
402. Larkin, Introduction: The First Decade, 10 PROC. NAT'L AGcA. ARB. viii, x (1957).

403. Colby and some others favored a small, elite group, almost a "union shop," while
others were more eager to open the doors to younger arbitrators.
404. To establish and foster the highest standards of integrity, competence, honor,
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earliest and most significant projects was the drafting of a "Code of Ethics and
Procedural Standards for Labor-Management Relations." The Code was
formulated in conjunction with representatives of the American Arbitration
Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The Code
6
was published in 1951405 and revised in 1974.40
With over six hundred members, the Academy's activities are clearly those
of a professional organization. The annual meetings provide a forum for
scholarly papers and practical discussion, and the Proceedings are published
annually by the Bureau of National Affairs. The Academy has sponsored programs for the training and development of new arbitrators in order to ease
the perceived shortage of acceptable arbitrators. 4 0 7 The Academy has also attempted to influence certain legislative proposals which may affect arbitrators.408 The Academy, quite commendably, has not restricted entry to the pro40 9
fession by endorsing certification proposals.
Differentiationin the Practiceof Labor Arbitration
The actual practice of labor arbitration has undergone significant changes
in the last forty years. Some changes are simply variations in traditional grievance arbitration, but others constitute new forms of arbitration. The first
category, adjustments in the traditional model, includes the adoption of the
quasi-judicial arbitrator in place of the mediatorial arbitrator; the concurrent
preference for single, ad hoc arbitrators instead of permanent tripartite panels;
and the evolution of more formal hearing procedures. All of these changes are
attributable to the rough consensus that emerged from the internal debates
discussed above.
and character among those engaged in the arbitration of industrial disputes on a professional basis; to adopt and encourage the acceptance of an adherence to canons
of ethics to govern the conduct of arbitrators; to promote the study and understanding of the arbitration of industrial disputes; to encourage friendly association among
the members of the profession; to cooperate with other organizations, institutions, and
learned societies interested in industrial relations; and to do any and all things which
shall be appropriate in the furtherance of these purposes.
NAA CONST, art. II, § 1, quoted in McKelvey, Preface to ToiE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBrTRAsupra note 321, at v. This section was amended in 1975 to make reference to the Code
of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes.
405. Reprinted in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRAnoN, supra note 321, at 151 and also
reprinted in 15 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 961 (1951).
406. The revised code now bears the title "Code of Professional Responsibility for
Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes." It has been reprinted many places, among
them 15 LAB. ARB. (BNA) at 51 and D. NOLAN, supra note 205, at 290.
407. The reports of the Academy's Committee on the Development of Arbitrators are
published in the Proceedings, 33 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Aim. 452 (1981).
408. See supra notes 309-312.
409. Despite recommendations from outside the profession that arbitrators should be
certified, supra note 390, arbitrators themselves have opposed the idea. Survey of the Arbitration Profession in 1969, 24 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 275, 180 (1971) (85% opposed to standardized entrance requirements); see also Aaron, Should Arbitrators Be Licensed or "Professionalized"?, 29 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 152 (1976); Coulson, supra note 390, at 202; 30 PRoc.
NAT'L ACAD. Aim. 202 (1977) (remarks of arbitrator Marcia L. Greenbaum).
TIoN,
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The rejection of Taylor's mediator model was almost complete by the time
Taylor wrote. The alternative quasi-judicial model was fostered by the War
Labor Board and expressly endorsed after the War by President Truman's
Labor-Management Conference on Industrial Relations. 410 One inescapable
difficulty with Taylor's approach was that in order to work successfully, it required one person to act as both mediator and arbitrator and few people
possessed both talents. 411 Apparently more people could successfully handle
the single assignment of a quasi-judicial arbitrator; in any case, that was what
the parties came to prefer. As they began to make their contracts more and
more detailed, parties indicated they were seeking a judgment interpreting
412
the agreement, not an unbounded opinion from a wise counselor.
The permanent chairman arrangement was most suited for Taylor's brand
of arbitration, while ad hoc arbitrators adapted most easily to the quasijudicial model. Consequently, the shift to the adjudicatory style triggered an
increase in the use of ad hoc arbitrators, contrary to Taylor's predictions. The
same factors explain much of the increased formality of modem labor arbitration. The essence of the judicial role is a decision based on the contract and
the evidence presented at the hearing. Therefore, the hearing must be conducted in an orderly fashion, relevant evidence must be gathered and presented
effectively, and testimony must be examined critically.413 In many cases, it also
seems necessary to the parties that a transcript be made and briefs filed. Because most lawyers have the necessary skills to effectuate these procedures and
many lay persons do not (or think they do not), there is a tendency to use
lawyers more frequently. Lawyers, in turn, are likely to proceed more formally
and to expect the arbitrator to conduct the hearing in a similar fashion. External pressures, such as the increased significance of the duty of fair representa44
tion, have reinforced this tendency toward formality. '
The transformation of traditional arbitration procedures was largely
complete twenty years ago. Since then, however, many innovations have developed outside the traditional format. One striking innovation does away
with one party- or rather, it substitutes the individual employee for the
union. Traditional arbitration arises from a contract between an employer and
a union, even though the contract is intended to benefit individual employees.
As the exclusive representative of the employees, the union typically controls

410. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also B. LANDIS, VALUE JUDGMENTs IN
(1977).
411. Harold Davey wrote shortly after Taylor's death: "Only a gifted minority of arbitrators can handle the delicate dual assignment of functioning as mediator-arbitrators . . .
there are very few arbitrators who can function effectively in the George Taylor manner."
Davey, Labor Arbitration:A Current Appraisal, 9 INDus. & LAB. REL. R v. 85, 88 (1955).
412. This became particularly true after 1947 when Congress made collective agreements
ARBrrRATON 6

enforceable in federal courts, and even more so as published arbitration awards marked out
principles of interpretation -the common law of the labor agreement. Abrams, supra note
32; Prasow &Peters, supra note 352, at 10-14.
413. See generallyAbrams, supra note 552.
414. Barreca, Arbitration- Recent Trends and Developments, in LABOR LAw DEVELOPAmNTs 1982 at 381 (proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Institute on Labor Law of
the Southwestern Legal Foundation).
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the processing of grievances through arbitration. 4 - Because the unrepresented
employee is left to the mercies of the employment-at-will doctrine, many
scholars have called for the provision of arbitration to all employees by statute
or by individual employment contracts. 416 A number of employers have
instituted arbitration plans even in the absence of unionization, so far with
only mixed success. 417 It may prove difficult for traditional arbitration to work
48
successfully without a union. 1
The remaining innovations have occurred in the context of a typical
unionized work force. The most widespread innovation has been the development of expedited arbitration arrangements. To reduce costs and speed up
arbitration awards, many unions and employers have agreed to a simplified
arbitration process, especially for minor disputes. Typically these agreements
specify the arbitrator will be selected in rotation from a predesignated panel,
the hearing will be within a, stated period of the demand for arbitration, it
will be informal, without transcript or briefs, and the arbitrator will render an
award at the end of the hearing or immediately thereafter. By and large, expedited arbitration plans have worked well and the parties to them have been
41 9
quite satisfied.
A less widespread but equally significant innovation has been the voluntary use of interest arbitration in the private sector. Mandatory interest
arbitration has long been used during wartime, in industries providing essential services, and in the public sector. In recent years, the practice has
grown somewhat in the private sector. In 1973, for example, the steel industry
adopted the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) as a way of minimizing the risk of strikes. The ENA provided that if the parties were unable to
resolve an issue of national significance in their next round of negotiations,
the issue would be submitted to an arbitration panel for a final, binding determination. 42' The steel agreement did encourage a few other employers and
415. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61
663, 724 (1973).
416.

CALIF.

L. REV.

Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes,

16 U. MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 249 (1983); Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration
of Employee Claims, 33 ARB. J. (n.s.) Sept. 1978 at 23; Coulson; Arbitration for the
Individual Employee, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J. 406 (1979-80); Mennemeier, Protection from Unjust
Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982); Summers, Individual
Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
417. See generally PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST DISCHARGE 4-20 (J.
Steiber & J. Blackburn eds. 1983).
418. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 934 (1979).
"In the absence of a union the goals of obedience, availability, finality, neutrality, and
efficiency would be difficult to achieve without considerable restructuring of the process."
419. Several such plans have been recently discussed in Barreca, supra note 414, at 385-87;
Frost, Expedited Arbitration Experience in the U.S. Postal Service, 29 LAB. L.J. 465 (1978);

Hoellering, Recent Development at the American Arbitration Association, 29 LAB. L.J. 477,
479-80 (1978); Murray & Griffin, Expedited Arbitration of Discharge Cases, 31 Am. J. (n.s.)
263 (1976); Sandver, Blaine & Wayar, Time and Cost Savings Through Expedited Arbitration
Procedures, 36 ARB. J. (n.s.) Dec. 1981 at 11.
420. D. NOLAN, supra note 205, at 226-28; see also Fischer, Significance of the Steel NoStrike Agreement, N.Y.U. 26TH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 93 (1973). Interest arbitration had been

used in a few smaller industries before adoption of the ENA. See, e.g., Platt, Arbitration of

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss4/1

72

Nolan and Abrams: American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years
1983]

LABOR ARBITRATION: MATURING YEARS

unions to adopt interest arbitration, but so far scholars have had more concern

with the topic than have parties to collective bargaining relationships.21
One of the surest signs that labor arbitration remains a viable, responsive
institution is that parties to collective agreements are able to tailor their
grievance and arbitration systems to their particular circumstances.22 Several
years ago, for example, the United Mine Workers and the bituminous coal
mining companies redesigned their ineffective grievance system, with generally
positive results.423 More recently, miners have been experimenting with
mediation of grievances before a formal arbitration hearing is held. 424 As
successful as traditional labor arbitration has been, its machinery can nonetheless be altered to make it more efficient, and individual circumstances may make

alterations essential.
CONCLUSION

American labor arbitration was well established by 1941, but it has changed
so much in the last four decades that its early practitioners would find it
strange. Before World War II, the concept of arbitration was poorly defined
and lacked a unified theory. Wise counsellors selected by the parties were
permitted to decide issues of great magnitude on little more basis than their
own sense of justice and acceptability. In its mature form, labor arbitration is
far more structured. Collective bargaining agreements carefully define the role
of arbitration in the labor-management relationship. Four decades of scholarship and practice have created a conceptual basis for arbitration which has
been accepted by practitioners, neutrals, and the courts. In place of the freewheeling expert, the modern arbitrator sits almost as a judge, trying to determine the intentions of the parties from the document they signed and the
ways they have conducted themselves under that agreement.
The first and greatest impulse in this transformation was the War Labor
Board. The WLB extended the use of arbitration to companies and entire industries that had previously resisted it; the experience of those companies was
sufficiently positive that they voluntarily retained arbitration agreements after
the War. The Board thus moved arbitration from a widespread system of dispute resolution to a universal one. The WLB also played a major role in esInterest Disputes in the Local Transit and Newspaper Publishing Industries, 26 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 8 (1974).
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tablishing the dominant judicial model of arbitration by narrowly defining
grievance arbitration and by strictly enforcing jurisdictional limitations. Other
WLB decisions on principles of arbitration were also influential, notably those
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements and on the presumptive validity
of awards, but none were more so than those defining the preferred model.
Finally, the WLB provided the private sector with a large body of experienced
arbitrators. The availability of skilled neutrals eased the fears of labor and
management about turning over their disputes to outsiders for resolution.
The changing legal environment was the second transforming force. The
enactment in 1947 of section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, and
its subsequent explication and expansion by the Supreme Court, provided a
private system and the official support it needed to survive the periods of labor
unrest. After Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, parties were on
notice that arbitration agreements and arbitration awards were backed by the
full strength of the federal courts. Quite possibly those decisions went overboard in their praise of and bias toward labor arbitration, but that wholehearted endorsement gave arbitration a credibility it could not otherwise have
achieved.
The key to the positive results of court support has been the maintenance
of a clear distinction between process and substance. The courts have been
unflinching in their assistance to the arbitration process, but, with few exceptions, they have been unconcerned with the substantive decisions made by
arbitrators. By maintaining this distinction, the courts have avoided becoming entangled in the merits of particular awards. Had they not done so,
arbitration would have served only as a detour on the way to the courts -a
detour labor and management would have soon learned to avoid.
The creation by the courts of the duty of fair representation and their
application of that duty to arbitration may mark a departure from the courts'
traditional abstention. By reviewing arbitrations for "arbitrary" or "perfunctory" conduct, the courts may demand more than a system designed for
informality can deliver. If the courts apply a standard within the capabilities
of parties and arbitrators, however, the duty of fair representation may improve the quality of union representation, and thus further strengthen the
labor arbitration process.
Other parts of the legal system have also contributed to the maturation
of labor arbitration. The NLRB's Spielberg and Collyer decisions may be
questionable interpretations of labor law, but they undoubtedly have effectively shifted authority in many disputes from a single government body to a
myriad of private ones. Arbitration statutes, chiefly the United States Arbitration Act and the Uniform Arbitration Act, have likewise shifted some power
over the interpretation of contracts from the courts to labor arbitrators. These
statutes have also provided arbitration with tools which can make it more
efficient and more effective. Here, too, there is a risk. Their provisions for
judicial review of arbitration awards invite more involvement with the merits
of disputes than is advisable, but as long as the Trilogy principles are respected the statutes should benefit labor arbitration more than they harm it.
The third impetus to the transformation of American labor arbitration
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has been largely internal. Over a period of forty years, arbitrators and others
debated about arbitration - the nature of the enterprise, its relationship with
other legal authorities and with external law, the quality of its practitioners,
and the efficiency of the process. Out of these debates grew the rudiments of a
theory of labor arbitration.
For example, the outcome of the debate between J. Noble Braden and
George Taylor was a strong consensus that grievance arbitrators should serve
as contract interpreters, not as mediators or contract makers. The response
of Professor Cox to Dean Shulman on the relationship between arbitration
and the courts marked out a path followed by the Supreme Court in Lincoln
Mills and the Trilogy. The ongoing controversy over the use of external law
by arbitrators sparked by Bernard Meltzer and Robert Howlett has produced
a general agreement that arbitrators should refer to positive law only rarely,
and then cautiously. Judge Hays' criticisms of the quality of labor arbitrators
may have won him few friends, but they did serve to focus attention on the
necessity of ensuring that those who held themselves out as arbitrators possessed
the requisite skills and training. The numerous recent programs by arbitration
agencies designed to identify talented individuals and to provide them with
"hands-on" experience stem in part from the concerns he raised. Similarly, postwar criticisms of the costs and delays of arbitration exposed real problems and
led some parties to modify their arbitration agreements to provide a faster
and less expensive method of resolving grievances.
The fourth major cause of the post-war development of American labor
arbitration was the contemporaneous professionalization of labor arbitrators
and differentiation in the practice of arbitration. Arbitrators began to see
themselves as practitioners of a learned trade, and accordingly they established
a professional body complete with entrance requirements, a code of ethics, and
educational programs. Their perceptions of themselves as professionals served
to distance them even more from the parties before them, and reinforced the
growing tendency toward the quasi-judicial mode. During the same period,
labor and management showed a new creativity by taking standard forms of
arbitration and tailoring them to meet their special needs. These innovations
have made it possible for arbitration to deal with a range of new issues as well
as more effectively respond to the traditional issues.
Without stretching the metaphor too far, it can be said that on the eve of
World War II labor arbitration was in its late adolescence. Its size, appearance
and personality were marked but incomplete. By 1983, arbitration has reached
full maturity. Its potential has been fulfilled, and it has played a critical role in
American industrial relations. Haphazard practices have been replaced with
an almost scientific experimentation, and there have even been attempts to
order disparate approaches by developing a unified philosophy.
Despite its strikingly successful recent past, the future of American labor
arbitration is by no means secure. Recent demonstrations of the flexibility of
labor arbitration suggest that there is still room for growth in the arbitral
process, but there are some troubling signs. The courts are no longer expanding the area of deference to arbitration, and the labor movement which
makes arbitration both needed and possible faces difficult times. The danger
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is not that arbitration will be abandoned by parties to collective bargaining
agreements or that it will retreat from its present position. The danger is,
rather, that it will cease to expand and improve. If its development slows, it
may in time be replaced by more responsive mechanisms of dispute resolution.
Pessimism is unwarranted, but concern is justified. Arbitration has fulfilled
its promise because it has been a dynamic process, shaped by the needs of labor
and management. If it maintains this essential characteristic, American labor
arbitration will be as successful in the future as it has been in the past.
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